The ideology of ISIS - a motivation for Europeans to become foreign fighters? by Waldeck, Annika
  
 
Standard front page for projects, subject module 
projects and master theses 
Compulsory use for all Master projects and the Master thesis at ISG: 
• International Development Studies 
• Global Studies 
• Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
• Public Administration 
• Social Science 
• EU studies 
• Public Administration, MPA 
 
Project title:  
The ideology of ISIS – a motivation for Europeans to become foreign fighters? 
Project seminar 
Master thesis 
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number): Kind of project: Module: 
Annika Waldeck 56112 Master Thesis K4 
   
   
   
   
   
Name of Supervisor:  
Thomas Vladimir Brønd 
Submission date:  
29.06.2015 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces: 
191.955 
ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY 
Department of Society and Globalisation 
  
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces: 
144.000 - 192.000 
 
 
NB! 
If you exceed the permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces your project will be 
rejected by the supervisor and/or the external examiner until 1 week after the 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The ideology of ISIS – 
a motivation for Europeans to become foreign 
fighters? 
 
Annika Waldeck 
Master Thesis in Global Studies 
Roskilde Universitet 
29.06.2015 
Supervisor: Thomas Vladimir Brønd 
 
  
Abstract 
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) announced the establishment of a 
caliphate in the territory of Syria and Iraq. ISIS has attracted thousands of foreign fighters 
from all over the world. This thesis investigates how ideology motivates Europeans to 
become foreign fighters, thereby closing the gap in the academic literature. On the basis of 
interviews and academic reports, the motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters 
can be grouped in three categories; the identity- and recognition-seekers, the thrill-seekers 
and the ones who want to help and support their fellow Sunni Muslims. The ideology of ISIS 
is investigated by analysing it according to the ideological morphology of Michael Freeden. 
This approach analyses ideologies by breaking them down into several concepts. The core 
concept of ISIS’s ideology is the goal of state building and expansion. Its peripheral concepts 
consist of the strategic means which serve to achieve the above goal; call upon hijrah 
(migration) and eschatology, as well as a violent interpretation of jihad. This thesis argues 
that the ideology of ISIS causes the Europeans to become foreign fighters and thereby 
influences their motivations. The caliphate serves as a safe haven for Sunni Muslims which 
results in hijrah to it. Moreover, eschatology causes foreign fighters to go to the caliphate, 
whereas jihad does not necessarily. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The Arab Spring was a wave of violent and non-violent demonstrations, riots and civil wars 
which began in Tunisia in 2010 and spread throughout the Arab world. While the outcome of 
this movement varied from country to country, it greatly increased the world’s awareness of 
the Middle East. In 2011 the Arab Spring reached Syria and initiated an ongoing civil war. 
Jihadi groups were quick to gain more power in the vacuum that was created following this 
insurgency. One group among them gained the most attention and territory; particularly 
when, in June 2014, it announced the establishment of a caliphate in the territory of Syria 
and Iraq: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While western governments condemned 
the violence of ISIS, European citizens’ reactions towards their Jihadi activities were divided. 
A small minority of Europeans left their lives behind and travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight 
for a Jihadi organisation which is too violent even for al-Qaeda. So what are the motivations 
of this ca. 0,000007%1 of the total population of the European Union? What kind of 
arguments could convince anyone to make such a huge step? This thesis investigates how 
ideology motivates Europeans to become foreign fighters in Syria and join ISIS. Many 
European governments declared Salafism a serious threat to their country’s democratic 
system (Kern, 2013). But what does Salafism mean? In what does a Salafi believe? ISIS is a 
popular topic in the media right now and many articles have been published describing their 
actions and territorial conquests. However, those behind ISIS, their goals and their strategies 
have not been a major feature either in the news or academic literature. The ideology of this 
Jihadi group is neither extensively known nor researched. These questions will be argued in 
this thesis, with the purpose to make the possible connection between the motivations of 
the Europeans to become foreign fighters and the ideology of ISIS plausible. 
1.1 Problem formulation 
How does ideology motivate the Europeans to become foreign fighters in Syria and join ISIS? 
1.2 Elaboration of the problem formulation 
In this section, I will briefly elaborate on my problem formulation, in order to define what I 
mean by the different terms and concepts set forth herein. 
                                                          
1
 Own evaluation: 4000 European foreign fighters out of 601 million inhabitants in Europe excluding Turkey and 
Russia (UN, 2015). 
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First of all, I will work with the definition of ideologies of Michael Freeden upon which I will 
elaborate in the theoretical chapter (chapter 4). According to him, ideologies are not static, 
and are shaped by several distinct political concepts. 
Second, the motivations of the Europeans to become foreign fighters are discovered in the 
academic literature and the interviews I conducted. They vary from case to case, however 
there is generally a combination of several motivational factors. Motivations consist of the 
factors which dispose the foreign fighter to go to Syria and fight for ISIS. These factors can be 
of social, economic or political nature (chapter 6.2). 
Third, the European foreign fighters are persons who fight in an insurgency in a country from 
which they do not hold a passport (chapter 6). I am aware of the unsecure data regarding 
the tasks fighters carry out. Not everybody goes to Syria and Iraq to fight; some go rather to 
engage in humanitarian aid. Nevertheless there is no distinction drawn between these two 
groups in statistics. All the persons leaving for Syria are considered foreign fighters. I will 
work with this data. Europe refers to all the countries on the European continent (except 
Russia and Turkey) whose citizens travelled to Syria to participate in the civil war in whatever 
capacity. 
Fourth, leaving for Syria indicates the fact that the majority of the foreign fighters travel to 
Syria to join ISIS, not Iraq, because of its easier accessibility. For the sake of simplicity, I shall 
from hereon in refer only to Syria; I acknowledge however that fragments of Iraq are part of 
ISIS’s territory. This thesis focuses on ISIS and the motivations of Europeans to become 
foreign fighters to join this radical organisation, even though it is not entirely clear how 
many of the foreign fighters actually join them. 
1.3 Working questions 
I will proceed to investigate the above through the following working questions. The first 
two questions will be examined in the theory and methodology chapters, respectively, and 
question three to five will be scrutinised during the analysis. 
1. According to Michael Freeden, what is the definition of ideology? 
2. How can I investigate my problem formulation, and how can I operationalise the 
theory of ideologies by Freeden? 
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3. What are the main motivational factors for Europeans to become foreign fighters? 
4. Of what does the ideology of ISIS consist? 
5. Does ISIS’s ideology reflect the motivations of the Europeans to become foreign 
fighters? 
1.4 Background knowledge on ISIS 
This section presents a short overview over ISIS and aims to give an impression of the scale 
of ISIS as well as valuable information for the analysis (chapter 7) and discussion (chapter 8). 
On the 29th June 2014 ISIS announced a caliphate on the territory of Syria and Iraq. In 
defiance of all hopes and claims the following numbers show the caliphate exists. 
Estimations fluctuate immensely depending on the sources. All measures were published in 
late 2014. 
ISIS’s fighters amounted to between 20,000 and 31,500 (CIA estimates) (Sciutto, Crawford 
and Carter, 2014) or 200,000 (Kurdish estimates) (Cockburn, 2014). The estimated number 
of people living under their rule varies between 4 and 8 million. (Munich Security 
Conference, 2015:37) ISIS has no financial shortage; estimates of their assets range between 
1 and 2 billion USD (Munich Security Conference, 2015:37), whereas 2 to 3 million USD per 
day (Reuter, 2015:268) result from oil sales. These numbers do not include the fortune out 
of plundering and expropriations. The caliphate comprises 100 000 km² in Syrian and Iraqi 
territory (Reuter, 2015:249). 
1.5 Limitations 
In this section I will briefly mention the limitations that came up in the process of my Master 
thesis. First, due to a lack of Arabic language skills I was not able to access the literature or 
material published by ISIS that is not translated into English, German or Spanish. 
Second, for security reasons I have not conducted interviews or contacted foreign fighters or 
returnees. 
Third, the ongoing insurgency causes an enormous output of news and information almost 
every day. I access and focus on the time period between the establishment of the caliphate 
and 1 June 2015. 
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Fourth, homepages like Twitter or Facebook delete the propaganda published by ISIS in 
order to prevent its further dissemination. This understandable and necessary step 
nevertheless made the collection of data more difficult, and consequently I could not find a 
small amount of the propaganda mentioned in reports. 
Fifth, this thesis does not seek to give any policy recommendations regarding how to prevent 
Europeans from becoming foreign fighters. Instead it aims to make the possible link between 
the motivations of the Europeans and the ideology of ISIS plausible. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
In this section I would like to present the structure of my Master thesis and explain the 
intentions of each part. 
1. Introduction: The introduction of the thesis should now have presented the reader 
with an introduction to the topic. This includes the problem formulation, the working 
questions, the further elaboration of the problem formulation and finally the 
limitations. 
2. Literature review: This chapter gives an overview over the width of literature treating 
theories of ideology, Salafism and Jihadism, the foreign fighters and the ideology of 
ISIS. The current debates and gaps in the literature will also be explained. 
3. The historical context of Islamism: The understanding of Islamism, Salafism and 
Wahhabism are blurred in the public discussion. This chapter aims to clarify the 
terms by outlining the historical context. 
4. Theories: Next, I will introduce the theoretical approach of the thesis. After outlining 
the theoreticians who influenced Michael Freeden in his theory of ideologies, this will 
be presented to give the reader the basis particularly for the analytical chapter. 
5. Methodologies: Following the theoretical approach the methodological 
considerations on how I intend to answer the problem formulation will be 
introduced. This section serves moreover to outline my data and to present the 
operationalisation of Freeden’s ideological morphology. 
6. European foreign fighters: After the methodological chapter I will introduce the first 
part of the analytical component. In order to clarify the phenomenon, a definition of, 
some statistics about, and the motivations of foreign fighters in Syria will be outlined. 
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7. The ideology of ISIS: In this chapter the ideology will be accessed by outlining the rise 
of ISIS. Afterwards, the ideologues of ISIS will be described and their influence in ISIS 
clarified. Finally, the last two sections intend to answer the problem formulation by 
making the potential link between the motivations of the Europeans to become 
foreign fighters with the concepts of ISIS’s ideology plausible. 
8. Discussion: The discussion will discuss the analysis as well as points out topics which I 
have only touched upon but need further research. 
9. Conclusion: This part will present my final conclusion to the problem formulation. 
 
2.0 Literature review 
This section aims to give an overview over the existing literature relevant for this thesis. I will 
start by characterising the literature on the theories of ideology. Afterwards, the literature 
on Salafism and Jihadism will be reviewed. Later, the literature about foreign fighters will be 
presented and finally the literature on the ideology of ISIS. Against this background, I will 
highlight how the approach of this thesis can provide a new perspective on its subjects.  
2.1 Theories of ideology 
The literature on ideology is diverse. It was the French philosopher, Antoine Destutt de 
Tracy, who actually coined the term.2 Among the best known authors on ideology are Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels. Even today their contribution continues to influenc the discourse 
in the academic literature, particularly because in most people’s heads Marx and Engels are 
the inventors of communism.3 The Frankfurt School is the school of social theory which 
created the critical theory which aims to change the society, rather than simply explaining it. 
In that sense, ideology is the main obstacle to human liberation. Main theorists of this school 
of thought were Theodor Adorno4, Max Horkheimer5 as well as Jürgen Habermas6 in second 
generation. Later Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Michael Freeden 
developed the term ideology and changed the meaning of ideology as a concept, which has 
                                                          
2
 See Destutt de Tracy, A (1992): Mémoire sur la Faculté de Penser. 
3
 See Marx, K and Engels, F (2012): The Communist Manifesto. 
4
 See Adorno, T and Horkheimer, M (2002): Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
5
 See Horkheimer, M (2012): Traditional and critical theory. 
6
 See Habermas, J (1984): The theory of communicative action, vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society. 
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come to a permanent concept in political theory. Whereas Mannheim took a sociologist 
standpoint7, Gramsci focused on the cultural hegemony as a method to maintain the 
capitalist state8. Both add the potential plurality of ideologies to the discourse. Althusser 
argues the importance of social practices influencing people’s selves, and the ideological 
practice that shape our values and beliefs.9 Finally, Freeden adds his theory of ideologies by 
denying the static nature of ideologies. According to him, ideologies evolve because the 
meaning and composition of the political concepts can change.10 This aspect of his theory of 
ideologies makes it very suitable for this thesis. 
2.2 Salafism and Jihadism 
A significant amount of literature has been published on Salafism and Jihadism, nevertheless 
the scholars rarely engage in specific aspects of contemporary Salafism. Focus lies on 
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia or different currents in Europe without dealing with the 
interconnected histories. Even after 2001, the increasing research on Salafism centres on the 
field of security studies, or radicalisation as a phenomenon. A profound study of Salafism 
and not only the Jihadi branches but also the pietist and political currents of Salafism was 
made in 2006 by Quintan Wiktorowicz in his article Anatomy of the Salafi Movement. A 
major contribution is done by Roel Meijer who edits the book Global Salafism and brings 
together experts from a broad range of disciplines. This book includes local and global 
aspects, identity, doctrine, politics and militancy of Salafism and is therefore seen as one of 
the main contributions to this field of study. Another important contribution is made by 
Amghar11, who elaborates on the currents of Salafism in Europe. Further contributions 
mainly divide the topic into regional organisations or differentiate between Salafi currents.12 
This thesis adopts the ideological perspective of Jihadism (Jihadi-Salafism) as a basis for the 
analysis. Research on the historical development of global Jihadism (only an introduction in 
chapter 2) or al-Qaeda does not play a major role. Nevertheless, global Jihadism has 
                                                          
7
 See Mannheim, K (1954): Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. 
8
 See Gramsci, A (1971): Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 
9
 See Althusser, L (1971): Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays. 
10
 See Freeden, M (2003): Ideology. A very short introduction; Freeden, M (1996): Ideologies and political 
theories. 
11
 See Amghar, S (2007): Salafism and Radicalization of Young European Muslims. 
12
 See Hegghammer, T (2009): Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant 
Islamism, Moussalli, A (2009): Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the enemy?; Leiken, R and Brooke, S 
(2007): The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood, Haykel, B (2009): On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, 
Rougier, B (2008): Qu’est-ce que le salafisme?. 
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attracted the most attention, principally by al-Qaeda as one of the largest radical 
organisations. Literature on al-Qaeda is primarily concerned with explaining the 
organisation’s leadership or ideology through its leaders and strategists, and with the texts 
that outline its history.13 However, more recently, the topic of lesser and greater as well as 
global and local jihad has caught the attention of researchers.14 This part of the literature 
treats the topic of acting locally or globally and whom to target; the West, or the local 
leaders and therefore differentiates between the different branches of Jihadism. 
2.3 Foreign fighters 
The topic of foreign fighters, and particularly European foreign fighters, has not yet received 
extensive study. The field has, however, experienced more attention in the wake of the 
Syrian civil war. Historically, nothing such as the mobilisation of foreign fighters to 
Afghanistan or Chechnya had been studied, even though the phenomenon had been 
apparent for centuries. Only from the beginning of the 2000’s was the term being used 
frequently in the media and as a topic for research. The most recent and profound book is 
from David Malet.15 He extracts the motivations for Europeans to become foreign fighters 
from historical evidence and from the conflicts in which they fought while profiling them. 
This work is one of the few of its kind. The great majority of scholars research either home-
grown terrorism16 or compare the two.17 Additional perspectives on foreign fighters are their 
history18 and the recruitment system19, and almost all the literature includes an introduction 
into the history of foreign fighting. These historical outlines generally include the reasons 
foreign fighters have for joining al-Qaeda.20 It serves as a helpful addition to my topic but it 
                                                          
13
 See Riedel, B (2010): The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future; Bergen, P (2006): The 
Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda’s Leader; Combating Terrorism Center (2007): Cracks in 
the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al Qaeda from 1989-2006. 
14
 See Gerges, F (2005): The Far Enemy. Why Jihad Went Global; Cook, D (2005): Understanding Jihad; 
Hemmingsen, A (2010): The attractions of Jihadism; Hegghammer, T (2010): Jihad in Saudi Arabia. Violence and 
Pan-Islamism since 1979. 
15
 See Malet, D (2013): Foreign Fighters. Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts. 
16
 See Precht, T (2007): Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe; Hinkkainen, K (2013): 
Home-grown Terrorism: The Known Unknown; Gartenstein-Ross, D and Grossman, L (2009): Home-grown 
Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. 
17
 See Hegghammer, T (2013): Should I stay or should I go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadis’ Choice 
between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. 
18
 See Malet, D (2009): Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions. 
19
 See Mendelsohn, B (2011): Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends; Hegghammer, T (2012): The recruiter’s 
dilemma: Signalling and rebel recruitment tactics. 
20
 See Felter, J and Fishman B (2007): Al-Qaida’s foreign fighters in Iraq; Venhaus, J (2010): Why Youth Join al-
Qaeda. 
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cannot be taken as a basis because of the differing characters of each insurgency and 
Islamist group. The reasons for the foreign fighters joining al-Qaeda do not necessarily 
correspond with the motivations in the Syrian case. Furthermore, although contemporary 
Muslim foreign fighters are the focus of several books, the historical development of the 
phenomenon nevertheless predominates.21 The most current contribution is made by Bram 
Peeters who compares various parameters (recruitment messaging, leaders, influence of 
governments, chances of success and internal disagreement) in seven Muslim foreign fighter 
mobilisations, including Syria.22 
In contrast to the foreign fighters, the reasons for radicalisation are well researched but the 
distinction between radicalisation and violent radicalisation is rarely made.23 Radicalisation 
and the travelling to another country as a foreign fighter are two distinct phenomena but are 
not always treated as such in the academic literature. Radicalisation literature tries to 
explain the foreign fighter phenomenon by drawing on either the social, cultural and political 
sphere24 or the social environment.25 There is no consent about why people become 
radicalised and neither about the reasons why radicals leave their home countries as foreign 
fighters. The perspectives vary since not all the scholars have had direct contact with foreign 
fighters but rather rely on experts or examine their political, social or economic 
environment. Reasons mentioned in the literature comprise the macro and micro level, the 
sociological, political and global as well as psychological and ideological drivers. Theories 
about the reasons and motivations vary, although there is agreement that there is not only 
one reason but a mix between several reasons or one trigger which prevails upon the person 
to leave his home country. Profiling or categorising foreign fighters has been a different 
approach which has been rejected by most scholars because of the risk of oversimplifying 
the topic. Moreover case studies of countries or persons exist.26 Currently the largest part of 
the foreign fighters’ literature is dedicated to the fear of the European countries about what 
happens when the foreign fighters return to their home countries. The militarily trained, 
                                                          
21
 See Hegghammer, T (2010a): The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters. 
22
 See Peeters, B (2014): A cross-case analysis of seven Muslim foreign fighter mobilisation (1980-2014). 
23
 See Dalgaard-Nielsen, A (2010): Violent Radicalization in Europe: what we know and what we do not know; 
Bartlett, J and Miller, C (2012): The Edge of Violence. 
24
 See Kepel, G (2004): The war for Muslim minds. Islam and the West; Khosrokhaver, F (2005): Suicide 
Bombers. Allah’s new martyrs; Roy, O (2004): Globalised Islam. The search for a new ummah. 
25
 See Wiktorowicz, Q (2004): Islamic activism. A social movement theory approach; Sageman, M (2004): 
Understanding terror networks. 
26
 See Coolsaet, R (2015): What drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case. 
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radicalised returnees bear a risk for Europe and the governments are concerned about 
attacks.27 The growth of literature on the foreign fighters which began at the outbreak of the 
civil war in Syria continues unabated. The lack of statistics regarding the foreign fighter’s 
affiliation to radical organisations is conspicuous. The only reliable statistics are from the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).28 
Additionally, the literature about foreign fighters specifically on the Syrian case is rare. 
Literature on this topic consists mostly of think tank reports, newspaper reports or short 
academic articles.29 Only rarely can academic books like anthologies or monographs be 
found.  
2.4 The ideology of ISIS 
The ideology of ISIS has not been treated by academics often, but rather by the media in 
newspaper articles. The ideology is linked to Jihadi-Salafism but has not yet gained a lot of 
attention as a separate topic. Given the recency of the topic this is not surprising, but it is 
still necessary to close the gap. The literature about ISIS’s ideology multiplies as this thesis is 
written. New books and reports have been published, especially in the last months. 
However, any in-depth research is still in its embryonic stage because of the scarcity of valid 
and accurate information. Researchers and journalists are not welcome in Syria, which 
makes the collection of data difficult. Supplementary, the security considerations of 
travelling to Syria constitute a major obstacle in reporting about the caliphate or its ideology. 
Therefore there is little accurately researched literature. The latest contributions to the 
literature about ISIS’s ideology are made by two German journalists, Christoph Reuter and 
Jürgen Todenhöfer. The former analyses the recently published notes of ISIS’s head 
strategist and draws conclusions regarding ISIS’s ideology as well as its structure.30 The latter 
spent ten days with ISIS and published a book on his experiences.31 Both authors have many 
years of experience in the Middle East. In addition, there are several reports, analysis paper 
                                                          
27
 See Bakker, E, Paulussen, C and Entenmann, E (2013): Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in Syria; Briggs, 
R and Silverman, T (2014): Western Foreign Fighters. Innovations in Responding to the Threat; Byman, D and 
Shapiro, J (2014): Be afraid. Be a Little Afraid. 
28
 See Neumann, P (2015): Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan 
conflict in the 1980s . 
29
 See Barrett, R (2014): Foreign Fighters in Syria; Kardaş, T and Özdemir, Ö (2014): The Making of European 
Foreign Fighters. Identity, Social Media and Virtual Radicalization; Zelin, A (2015): Foreign Fighter Motivations; 
Vidino, L (2014): European Foreign Fighters in Syria: dynamics and responses. 
30
 See Reuter, C (2015): Die schwarze Macht. Der „Islamische Staat“ und die Strategen des Terrors. 
31
 See Todenhöfer, J (2015): Inside IS – 10 Tage im ‚Islamischen Staat’. 
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and research notes about ISIS’ ideology. Commonly, these texts include several aspects; the 
history, the structure or governance and the ideology of ISIS and do not focus on just the 
ideology.32 None of these mentioned texts include a theory in their analyses. Moreover, 
there is literature which compares and contrasts ISIS and al-Qaeda, especially the break 
between al-Zarqawi and his spiritual and ideological mentor al-Maqdisi.33 Nonetheless, the 
amount of reports or detailed studies is small. Another obstacle is the dynamic nature of the 
topic which leads to the fact that literature outdates quickly. Developments which occurred 
during the last year and their documentations are in several cases no longer current. 
This thesis investigates the possible link between the motivations of foreign fighters to join 
ISIS and its ideology. Scholars have treated the topics in different papers but not as a joined 
project. This text aims to close this gap. A further contribution of this thesis is the analysis of 
ISIS’s ideology following Michael Freeden’s pattern of the morphological composition of 
ideologies. The ideology of ISIS has not been examined in that way. Therefore, the 
examination of the ideology as a potential factor in the motivation of Europeans to become 
foreign fighters is the first contribution. The morphological analysis of ISIS’s ideology 
represents the second contribution of this thesis to the academic literature. 
 
3.0 The historical context of Islamism 
To understand the analysis in chapter 7, it is crucial to give a basic understanding of what the 
context of Islamism consists of. This chapter serves moreover to clarify the concept of 
Salafism as the understanding of the term varies significantly. Classical Salafism can be found 
in almost all the radical movements in the Middle East. Therefore, it serves as the starting 
point. Next, I will give an overview over Wahhabism and later over the Islamic Modernism. 
Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood and the currents of Salafism (purist Salafism, political 
Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism) will be outlined. 
                                                          
32
 See Bunzel, C (2015): From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State; Saltman, E and Winter, 
C (2014): Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism; Barrett, R (2014a): The Islamic State; Friedland, 
E (2015): The Islamic State; al-‘Ubaydi, M et al. (2014): The group that calls itself a state; Caris, C and Reynolds, 
S (2014): ISIS governance in Syria. 
33
 See Kazimi, N (2005): A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi;  Zelin, A (2014): The war 
between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement. 
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3.1 The classical Salafism 
Most scholars emphasise that the term Salafism derives in the Islamic tradition from the 
expression al-salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors), which comprised the Prophet and his 
companions (Roy, 2004:25). Additionally, the term salafi comes from the Arabic term salaf 
which means ‘to precede’ (Wiktorowicz, 2001:111). 
Salafism is considered a variant of pan-Islamism. This term refers generally to those political 
or religious transnational movements whose aim is the unity of ummah. The concept of pan-
Islamism has its roots in the late nineteenth century and the rise of modern Islamism. The 
idea of the ummah is central. Three different manifestations of pan-Islamism appear: 
caliphism, foreign policy coordination, and popular mobilisation. They differ in the 
interpretations of ummah and the way in which it is utilised. (Hegghammer, 2010:17-18) 
The Prophet’s companions constitute of the four first caliphs of Islam – Aboubakr, Omar, 
Othman and Ali – who were the companions of the Prophet during Muhammad’s apostolate 
in the 7th century. Additionally, the two generations of successors are included in the term 
salaf, the pious ancestors. Since they have learned the religion directly from the Prophet 
they understand the true meaning of it. Those three generations represent the golden age of 
Islam. Their conquests extended the empire from Spain to India. Clerics link these military 
achievements to the piety of the salaf. For that reason theologians have suggested a return 
to the Islam of the salaf whenever there is a social, economic or political crisis. Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal (780-855) and Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) were the first to formalise this 
idea, each at a time when the Muslim empire or regions of it were under attack. (Amghar, 
2007:39-40) Although ibn Hanbal is considered to be the precursor of Salafism, it emerged as 
a school of thought only in the fourteenth century. Ibn Taymiyya and his pupils turned 
Salafism from an idea into a complex philosophy. Their interpretations and the applications 
to real life remain a significant source to Salafis. His teaching is taken literally and constitutes 
the basis for the Salafism as we understand it today. (Alshech, 2014:422) 
Since the Shia Muslims dispute the succession following Muhammad’s death in which the 
Sunnis believe, Salafism does not typically apply to them. This dispute centres on the 
successor of Muhammad. The Sunni Muslims argue that the close companion Abu Bakr 
should lead the faithful. Contrary to this, the Shia Muslims believe in the direct descendant 
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as a successor, namely the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law Ali. Consequently Shia Muslims 
contest the authenticity of hadith, the basis of Salafism. This discussion represents the major 
difference and contentious issue between the two branches which will not be discussed 
further in this text. (Browers, 2013:628) 
The foundation of Salafism is the Quran and the sunnah which outline the perfect model of 
the Muslim community and therefore represent the only legitimate religious source of 
reasoning (Hegghammer, 2009:249). The sunnah dictates the way of living the Prophet 
taught the Muslims in theory and practice to earn Allah’s approval through complete 
submission to his commandments. It represents the right path to salvation. The concept of 
tawhid (the unity of God) is another central issue in Salafism. Ibn Taymiyya divided the unity 
of God into two categories; the unity of lordship and the unity of worship. The former refers 
to God being the only sovereign and creator of the universe. The latter obliges people to 
accept only God’s law, man-made law should be rejected and obedience given only to sharia 
(Islamic legal system). (Wiktorowicz, 2005:78) Three components must be accepted by 
Salafis in order to follow the ‘real Islam’. First, there is the Oneness of God who is the sole 
creator and sovereign of the universe, the basis of all monotheistic religions. Second, the 
denial of all human characteristics of God because of his supremacy must be accepted. He is 
entirely unique. Humans must follow the sharia because God is the supreme legislator. 
Neglecting this is to imply that humans can legislate, which only God can do. Hence, Salafis 
reject Secularism and the consequent separation of religion and state, as this contradicts the 
unique power of God to govern, and puts man’s laws above God’s word. Third, the only one 
who can be worshipped is God. Therefore, praying in front of important religious figures is 
forbidden, as this is seen as worshipping something other than God. Moreover, it means that 
Islam is a way of life. Every act must be in accordance to Islamic law and devoted to 
worshipping God. The actions (manhaj) and the belief (aqida) must both be devoted to God. 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006:208-209) 
A third important source of reasoning is the hadith, which is used to complement the Quran. 
Studying these commentaries on the sayings, teachings and acts of the Prophet give as many 
details as possible about Muhammad in order to apply them in everyday life in order to live 
in a strictly Islamic way. (Wagemakers, 2012:5) By returning to the fundamentals of the faith 
from the Quran and following the path of Prophet Mohammad (sunnah), Salafis hope to 
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rebuild the empire as it was during the golden age of Islam. All interpretations not based on 
the original sources of the religion are seen as a distortion and need to be eradicated. These 
so called impurities, introduced over centuries, distract the believers from the right path of 
God. (Stemmann, 2006:2) Thus, the past represents the ideal and the goal. This standard 
cannot be changed, just as the word of God written down in the Quran is immutable. The 
evolution of the society, challenges and circumstances must be counterbalanced with the 
religious practice which is unchangeable. It cannot accommodate contemporary challenges 
because of the unchangeable word of God. Hence, the challenges from contemporary life 
must be addressed with the unchanged religious principles. (Wiktorowicz, 2001:111) 
Consequently, a Salafi is a person who strictly follows the Quran and sunnah and worships as 
well as copies the salaf example. 
3.2 Wahhabism 
Wahhabism derives from the religious tradition of Salafism; therefore all Wahhabis are 
Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. (Moussalli, 2009:3) Wahhabism is accordingly a 
narrower designation, a stricter interpretation and calls itself the true Salafi movement. 
Wahhabism is formed by the intellectual heritage of the preacher Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab (1703-1792). He was himself a reader of Ibn Taymiyya’s texts (which is why scholars 
contend that Wahhabism has its origin in Salafism) and the cofounder of the first Saudi state 
in 1744. The Wahhabi religious tradition is therefore closely related to the Saudi Arabian 
state whose official doctrine it became. (Lacroix, 2009:59) 
In 1746, the Ibn Saud/al-Wahhab state (third Saudi state) declared jihad against other 
Muslims. A campaign of destruction was begun, which targeted Shia and Sufi shrines and 
places, as well as occupying the holy cities Medina and Mecca. This was in order to ‘purify’ 
Islam and destroy all mediators (shrines, tombs, statues) between man and God (Cook, 
2005:74). Like his predecessors, ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab believed that the Muslim society was 
ignorant about religion. They lived a life full of ignorance (jahiliyya). According to Wahhabis, 
the only way to revive the glory of the golden age is the re-assertion of absolute 
monotheism and the belief in the Oneness of God (tawhid). As discussed above, this idea 
was taken from the Salafi doctrine but carried to a greater extreme. To achieve this purity of 
faith, ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab condemned every form of mediation between man and God. The 
worship of tombs of saints, astrology, and polytheism were common practice in Mecca 
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before Muhammad started to preach Islam. According to classical Salafism and Wahhabism, 
these customs were seen as the state of ignorance (jahiliyya) and needed to be removed. 
These practices are classified as “shirk (polytheism), kufr (unbelief in God), ridda (apostasy), 
and bida’ (innovations)” (Moussalli, 2009:4). Wahhabism teaches its followers to adhere to 
strict monotheism and fight shirk. Furthermore, it is forbidden for Wahhabis to listen to 
certain types of music, to draw human beings or living things that contain a soul, to pray 
while visiting tombs or to build shrines. (Moussalli, 2009:4) Only when intention and practice 
were in agreement would the entering of the paradise (jannah) be ensured. Although the 
faith is a central focus of Wahhabism, the intention of faith was not sufficient. Hence the 
practice in itself without the acceptance of the Oneness of God was regarded as a sin. 
(Meijer, 2009:4-5) While tawhid is a major concept in Islam, the right belief is not sufficient 
but has to be combined with ‘pure’ Islamic performance, according to the Wahhabis 
(Mousalli, 2009:4). 
Al-Wahhab preached an interpretation of Islam that judged every element deriving from 
Sufism (mystical interpretation of Islam) or Shi’ism as disbelief. The practice of takfir (the 
process of declaring someone, usually Muslims, as infidels) is an important concept in 
Wahhabism. The prevalent ideology of Wahhabism does not accept non-Wahhabis as 
Muslims. They claim to be the only real bearers of pure Islam. Practices such as 
jurisprudence that have evolved over time are condemned. Therefore, the four schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence in which the Sunni Muslims believe are rejected in Wahhabism 
Moussalli, 2009:4). Hence, Sunni Muslims are considered unbelievers, moreover because 
they moved away from the way of al-salaf and live under a political system that is unknown 
to the companions of the Prophet. They do not accept Muslims following other beliefs, Shia 
and Sunni Muslims equally. (Alshech, 2014:422) 
The Wahhabis call themselves Salafis, following the pious ancestors of the Prophet, which 
represent an ideal towards which all Muslims should strive. If not Salafis they use the term 
Muwahhid (one who professes God’s unity) (Moussalli, 2009:4-5).The use of the term Salafis 
in various contexts leads to the confusion about the meaning. 
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3.3 The Islamic Modernism (earlier salafiyya) 
Wahhabism is not the only revivalist movement. In the 19th century the Egyptian 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) promoted a different 
interpretation of Salafism. Both, the contemporary Salafis and the Islamic modernists, regard 
themselves as al-salafiyya which has led to the false conclusion that they share a common 
ideology. However, the earlier salafiyya are mainly rationalist Asharis who believe in the 
usage of the mind in Islamic faith. (Wiktorowicz, 2006:212) The basic difference between 
Wahhabism and this Islamic revival movement is the distinct approach towards the West.34 
Rida and Abduh acknowledged the threat posed by the West, but saw also a possibility to 
emulate. Conversely, on first contact with the West, Wahhabism rejected all western 
influence and objects for the sake of doctrinal purity. According to Rida, a return to the 
sources of Islam (Quran, hadith, sunnah) does not contradict the acceptance of western 
models. He accepts western education and technology. Furthermore, the so called 
Enlightened Salafis did not agree with the literalist theological teachings of Ibn Taymiyya 
about tawhid. This Islamic movement did not consist of literalists and does not consider the 
hadiths unconditionally authoritative. In contrast to the classical Salafism, interpretive 
methodology is considered a valid method. Their project is to lift the Muslim society out of 
lethargy by finding the right resources to generate a renaissance of Islam. This reform of 
Muslim society does not emphasise the division of the world into believers and unbelievers. 
The condemnation of other Muslims’ theological heresies is not of major importance. Their 
vision is more inclusive and is concerned with the uplifting of the Muslim society as a whole, 
not promoting ‘right’ Islam over the ‘wrong’. This more rational doctrine is mainly linked to 
Abduh because of the convergence of Rida towards traditional ibn Taymiyya’s teaching after 
Abduh’s death. (Haykel, 2009:46) 
3.4 The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a political movement in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna 
(1906-1949) in Egypt and is therefore the oldest Islamist organisation in the world. The 
Muslim Brotherhood is commonly considered a part of the Salafi movement. Since Salafi 
derives from the pious ancestors, and their aim is to revive Islam by a return to Islamic 
origins, the Muslim Brotherhood can be included into Salafism. Nevertheless, in 
                                                          
34
 In this thesis the west is defined as North America, Europe and Australia, whereas Australia plays a minor 
role. 
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contemporary Egypt the Salafi movement and Muslim Brotherhood are seen as distinct 
Islamic currents. The distinctive understanding of Salafism and its derivation is the reason for 
major confusion about the term. (Leiken and Brooke, 2007:107) In this thesis, Salafism and 
Wahhabism are closely related concepts, but the Islamic modernism movement of Abduh 
and Rida, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, are considered as distinct movements. 
However, both movements must be mentioned here in order to complement the historical 
context and due to the fact that Qutb is still frequently quoted by Jihadis. In particular, his 
reinterpretation of the collective duty to help Muslims around the world into individual duty 
is a significant contribution to the Jihadi literature. 
The foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood took place in a time when Egypt had recently 
(1922) gained independence from the United Kingdom and established its own government 
based on a parliamentary system implementing a constitution. The early aim of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was to build an Islamic society by applying Islamic law, support the poor by 
establishing humanitarian facilities and free the country from the British influence. Although 
the British officially withdrew in 1922, the occupation continued until the 1950’s, when a 
coup d’état was the starting point for the Egyptian Republic. (Abu-Amr, 1994:1) The unique 
character of combining grassroots activism with the Islamic ideology distinguished them 
from earlier reformers. Their tactics were to enforce Islamic norms through charity work in 
education and social activities. Over time, their political significance challenged the secular 
leadership. Created in Egypt, branches started to spread into other Arab countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. (Wiktorowicz, 2001:4) The Muslim Brotherhood supported 
the Palestinian revolt in 1936, in which they actively engaged, as did they also in armed 
attacks on Jewish installations in Palestine. Al-Banna established a paramilitary wing that 
engaged in fighting the British rulers and was responsible for a number of bombings and 
assassinations. One of the most important intellectuals of the Muslim Brotherhood was the 
Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) who joined the organisation in the 1950’s. Under Gamal 
Nasser’s rule the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt and thousands of members 
imprisoned. This introduced a schism, one division followed Qutb’s proclamation that as 
kafir (disbeliever) declared Muslims were legitimate targets of jihad, whereas the other 
stayed with the successor of al-Banna who argued that only God can judge someone’s faith. 
(Leiken and Brooke, 2007:108-110) Qutb contributed to the literature with, among other 
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works, his book Milestones in which he outlined his thoughts on jihad, and, most 
importantly, the all- embracing introduction of sharia, because only where the “Islamic faith, 
the Islamic way of life and the Shari’ah of God is dominant” (Qutb, 2007:124) could be called 
fatherland. 
3.5 The currents of Salafism 
As I have outlined above, Salafis are united by a common creed which provides principles 
but as well methods how to apply the beliefs to contemporary issues. In the following, I will 
outline the three currents starting with the purist Salafism, afterwards the political Salafism 
and finally the Jihadi-Salafism. They are differentiated by their respective approaches to the 
modern problems. The distinction is essential in order to create the basis for the analysis in 
chapter 7. 
3.5.1 The purist Salafism 
Most within the Salafist movement belong to the purist (also predicative or pietist) current 
of Salafism. It is distinguished by its rejection of all political interference, any different types 
of ideologies, beliefs or behaviours. Political participation leads to a loss of identity and 
signals a lack of faith in God. Purist believers trust God and lay their fate in his hands. 
Political interference questions God’s power and is therefore rejected. (Adraoui, 2009:368-
371) Moreover, the beliefs and values in democratic systems differ significantly from the 
ones manifested in the sharia. Even if the politics concern European Muslims, Salafis, 
belonging to this current of Salafism do not get involved to fight for their political rights, but 
rather demonstrate withdrawal. The participation in a non-Muslim political system is 
forbidden because it would implicitly recognise the same level of importance between Islam 
and the western society’s problems. (Amghar, 2007:44) 
According to purist Salafis, education and purification were the keys to solving the problems 
Muslims are facing. Therefore, according to this school, revolutionary actions do not bring 
Allah’s kingdom to Earth. The preaching of the pure Islamic thought will create a world order 
in which Islam is pre-eminent. It is considered as an eschatological and apodictic faith. This 
tendency does not see Jihad or other forms of violence as the right measure to build an 
Islamic society and state. Thus, they do not support the entry of militant Muslims into 
politics. Although the predicative Salafism does not allow political integration it promotes a 
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non-confrontational line towards the government or the dominant political power. They 
reject all violent means. (Amghar, 2007:43-45) Christians, Jews and the West are seen as 
eternal enemies which destroy Islam by imposing their values and beliefs (Wiktorowicz, 
2006:218). 
3.5.2 The political Salafism 
This second tendency uses political activism to convince the Muslims that the Islamic state is 
necessary. Only a small minority belongs to this current within the Salafi movement. The 
relative unity of Salafi movement was challenged when the Muslim Brothers were fleeing 
from Nasser and found a new home in Saudi Arabia. The well-educated and politically 
experienced newcomers brought a politicised agenda to the purist background of Saudi 
Arabia. The Muslim Brothers held high positions within the state and education system. In 
the 1980s the young scholars who left university were taught in politicised Salafism and 
challenged the so far purist environment of scholarship. They remained faithful to Salafism, 
and felt no conflict with it as they expanded their domain to politics. According to their 
approach, Islam can best be protected by addressing political issues. The considerable break 
with the senior purists happened when Saudi Arabia’s authorities (purists) permitted 
American troops to stay in Saudi Arabia. According to the political Salafis, the purists could 
not assess the consequences of this, which they assumed would be the beginning of a 
strategy of colonisation. They condemned the purists for telling Muslims to pray, while the 
leaders facilitated the destruction of their country. The frustration about the elderly purists 
grew. (Wiktorowicz, 2006:222) Although the political actions (they generally refrain from 
declaring revolution) are comparable with the ones the Muslim Brotherhood applies, the 
political Salafis disagree with them. According to the political Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood does not comply with the centre of Salafism, the return to the roots of Islam. 
They accuse them of standing for a too modernised version of Islam. (Amghar, 2007:45) 
Their engagement in politics can be seen as contradictory to Salafi tradition. Tawhid 
prohibits engaging in politics because of the denial of the oneness of God, and of him as the 
only sovereign. According to political Salafis, the application of the Salafi beliefs to politics 
impacts social justice and advances the right of God alone to legislate. (Amghar, 2007:46) 
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3.5.3 Jihadi-Salafism 
The third current is Jihadi-Salafism (short Jihadism). It is mainly distinguished by the 
acceptance of violence as a means to achieve their goals. This current emerged during the 
war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. There the Jihadis (to a certain extent foreign 
fighters) learned their political lesson on the battlefield and brought these experiences back 
to their home countries. In the 1990’s, the division between the political and Jihadi-Salafis 
became rather blurred, as the Jihadis accepted the moderate approach of the political Salafis 
to simply reproach the purists for not understanding the contemporary political situation, 
but not to fight them. Jihadis represented a marginal faction in the Salafism environment. 
When the Saudi Arabian regime started in the mid-1990s to imprison the political Salafis due 
to their criticism of the government’s alignment with the US, the Jihadis denounced the 
purist clerics, and so the break between the groups was carried out. (Wiktorowicz, 2006:225-
227) 
Jihadism cannot be separated from the religious and ideological context of Salafism, from 
which it emerged. Jihadism is a relatively new term which arises from the Arabic term jihad 
that means struggle or holy war. In the late 1990s, Jihadism gained more attention in the 
academic literature, and after 9/11 it served to distinguish between violent and non-violent, 
progressive or democratic Islamists. Interestingly, Shia militants such as Hezbollah or Hamas 
are not called Jihadis, rather the term refers only to Sunni radicals. Among the western 
scholars Jihadis are understood as militant or violent Islamists, whereas among Muslims 
Jihad is rather a noble religious concept. Although it is challenging to find a widely 
acknowledged definition for Jihadi-Salafism, three political characteristics are mentioned 
repeatedly. First, Jihadi-Salafi groups are considered to be more extreme in their approach 
than other groups. Second, they are perceived to draw on Salafi or Wahhabi traditions rather 
than the more pragmatic approach of Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood. Third, the 
common enemy is the West, and hence they operate more internationally than other 
groups. (Hegghammer, 2009:253) 
There are, however, several problems with this definition. First, the issue of how to measure 
extremism is a perennial struggle. From which level of violence onwards should a group be 
considered Jihadi-Salafi, if the level of violence is the acknowledged determinant. Secondly, 
there is an ongoing discourse apparent in the literature about the question of whether 
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Sayyid Qutb’s work is counted into the Jihadi-Salafi camp. He is cited by groups seen as 
Jihadi-Salafi. Additionally, Abdallah Azzam, closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, is still 
being admired as a martyr. Third, the discussion about the far and the near enemy is not 
settled. Several militant groups have never targeted the west. (Hegghammer, 2009:254-256) 
There is a tendency in the western literature and policy to view Jihadism as one 
phenomenon that is seen as the motivation for every attack without differentiating between 
several Jihadi ideologies. Jihadi is used as a generic term which refers to all transnational 
violent Islamists, regardless of their targets and goals.35 (Hemmingsen, 2010:125) As the 
analysis will show, there are several branches within the ideology Jihadism. In order to stay 
within the scope of this thesis, Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azzam will only be discussed when 
considering the new interpretation of the individual duty to support the fellow Muslims. ISIS 
does not otherwise take these ideologues into account. 
Jihad as a legitimate means to fight Muslim leaders sets Jihadi-Salafism apart from the so 
called quietist (non-political) and political Salafism that support non-violent jihad in the 
classical sense as to defend the ‘house of Islam’ (Muslim ruled countries) from the ‘house of 
war’ (countries where Islamic laws are not in force). Consequently, applying jihad in the own 
house against Muslim rulers is an appropriate means reserved for Jihadi-Salafis. 
(Wagemakers, 2012:63) Abdullah Azzam sees it as a duty for Muslims to participate in jihad. 
It is an individual duty of every Muslim to join defensive jihad against any enemy who 
invades a Muslim country which cannot defend itself. (Wiktorowicz, 2005:84) 
"The obligation of jihad today remains fard 'ayn [individually 
obligatory] until the liberation of the last piece of land which was in 
the bands of Muslims but has been occupied by the Disbelievers" 
(Azzam, 1979). 
The environment of Islamism is complex and includes various branches. As it is not the main 
concern of this thesis, this section aimed only to give an overview to contextualise the topic 
in the field of Islamism. Distinguishing between the branches is challenging since they are 
interconnected and influence each other to a certain degree. Nowadays, the scholar’s 
understanding of the term Salafism refers to the classical concept of Salafism mixed with the 
interpretation of Wahhabism. The three currents within Salafism are overlooked mainly by 
                                                          
35
 In this thesis I will define Islamists as a Muslim religious activist and Jihadis as violent Sunni Islamists. 
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the press and all Salafis are viewed as terrorists. Particularly Jihadi-Salafism is important in 
this thesis because it gives the basis for the ideology of ISIS, who use violence as a means to 
their ends. Having clarified the term Salafism and distinguishing between the perceptions of 
the terminology in the academia and media, I shall first outline the theory and 
methodologies, before starting the analysis. 
 
4.0 Theories 
To organise the complex data, analyse both interviews and literature and investigate the 
research question, this thesis relies on the theory of ideologies as developed by Michael 
Freeden. 
Ideology as a theoretical concept will give the emphasis for this thesis. Most importantly 
Michael Freeden’s Ideology: a very short introduction contributes to this theoretical 
approach. I will start and finish with Freeden’s approach to ideologies while a selection of 
the academics (de Tracy, Marx and Engels, Mannheim, Gramsci, Althusser), who have 
elaborated on ideology and influenced his work will be discussed in between to clarify his 
theory and the evolution of the same. 
4.1 Freeden’s theory of ideologies 
Ideologies evoke strong, mainly negative emotional responses. The most common 
association with ideologies are the “isms”, such as communism or anarchism. In many cases 
this denotes ideologies but not all “isms” are connected to an ideology (consider, for 
example, optimism) and not every ideology has been dropped from above on an unwilling 
society to change their belief system. All of us consume and produce ideologies every day, 
aware or unaware. They map the political and social worlds for us. We as human beings try 
to make sense of the reality, of the things we see. These attempts of understanding do not 
provide the same outcomes; everybody creates their own beliefs and realities. Without the 
mapping of the world we remain clueless, confronted by random bits of information of 
which we cannot make sense. (Freeden, 2003:1-3) Still, ideologies as a political genre are 
neither appreciated nor sufficiently used in the literature or politics, even though through 
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them access to the units of political thinking can be provided. Furthermore ideologies must 
be seen in their “cultural, temporal, spatial and logistical” (Freeden, 1996:14) frameworks. 
“[…], ideologies constitute a product of the human mind that can be 
ascertained through a threefold process: employing the conceptual 
analysis that political theorists have been trained to handle; utilizing 
the type of empirical and contextual inquiry in which historians are 
versed; and appreciating the morphological patterns which 
contribute to the determination of ideological meaning” (Freeden, 
1996:14). 
This perspective on ideology is still rarely seen and will be applied in this thesis. The 
capability of ideologies to change and to develop over time that frees them from the 
association with a static concept is evident in Freeden’s quote. For that, the context has to 
be taken into account when working with ideologies. 
4.1.1 Antoine Destutt de Tracy, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
Nevertheless, the connotation of ideologies is marked by distrust. The French philosopher, 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy, coined the term ideology after the French Revolution. His 
intention was the creation of a synonym for the science of ideas and to thereby introduce a 
proper branch of study concerned with ideas. Destutt de Tracy desired to establish ideals of 
thought and action that would be empirically verifiable. (Kennedy, 1979:353) Hence, the 
originator of the word did not introduce the term with a negative connotation or purpose. 
“Its [ideology] purpose [was] knowledge of effects and their practical consequences” 
(Destutt de Tracy, 1992:324). 
In the 19th century the German philosophers, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, added another 
association to ideology. They criticised the prevailing German philosophical fashion which 
promoted the independent existence of ideas, thoughts and consciousness by exchanging 
illusory for correct thought. But instead, according to Marx and Engels, their thoughts were 
only phrases rather than the reality. Philosophers represented a superstructure and 
concealed the reality and therefore adopted the form of an ideology. (Marx and Engels, 
1970:41) In their understanding, ideology was an instrument in the hands of the rulers to 
make the members of the subservient class – the proletariat – believe that certain, the 
ruling, ideas possessed a universal validity. The ruling ideas in this sense are held by “the 
class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
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force” (Marx and Engels, 1970:64). Ideology was therefore a tool to exercise control and 
domination. The ruling class had to give their ideas a universal validity in order to make the 
working class believe that those dominant ideas were actually theirs too. As a consequence, 
exploited workers internalised the ideology to an extent that they associated a 14 hours 
work day as necessary for the industrial order. According to Marx and Engels, ideology was a 
condition which had to be overcome. Ideology only gets mentioned in reference to the ruling 
class, never to the working class. There cannot be an ideology which serves the interest of 
the dominated class, only ideas. It reinforced an illusion which kept societies in a state of 
ignorance and suffering and social unity maintained. (Marx and Engels, 1970:65) The 
‘camera obscura’ served as an analogy to show ideology as an inverted mirror-image of the 
material world. The illusion was created by the social conditions under capitalism. Calling the 
understanding of the world an illusion required believing in a non-illusory condition. Marx 
was convinced that truth would emerge as soon as the distortion (ideology) was removed. 
That means that the true human and material relations are blurred as a result of the 
ideological bias. However, the social truth was not easy to expose because of the different 
belief and value maps people have. According to the distinct interpretations of cases and 
situations, the outcome will look different from person to person. Still, the philosophers did 
not doubt that there was a truth that could be revealed. In their point of view, ideology was 
dispensable and a product of historical circumstances. Once these circumstances improve 
the distorted factor will disappear. (Marx and Engels, 1973:831) The connotation of ideology 
is negative in Marx and Engel’s interpretation. 
4.1.2 Karl Mannheim 
After the acknowledgement of Marx and Engels of ideology as a temporary concept, scholars 
transformed it into a permanent feature of the political. The sociologist Karl Mannheim 
(1893-1947) is seen as the founder of the sociology of knowledge. He was occupied in 
finding out the social origins of knowledge so that the knowledge can become less 
ideological or utopian, but rather more scientific to detect the ill of society and build one 
more just. Knowledge is socially conditioned and influenced by certain knowledge frames 
which are based on presuppositions. 
“We must realise once and for all that the meanings which make up 
our world are simply an historically determined and continuously 
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developing structure in which man develops, and are in no sense 
absolute” (Mannheim, 1954:76). 
Social groups behave regarding certain shared rituals, stories and histories. Ideologies are 
influenced by these shared values. He realised that ideologies are a characteristic of all social 
environments and influence the thoughts of human beings. It means that ideologies are not 
the product of the social conditions under capitalism (Marxism) but a reflection of all 
historical and social environments, according to Mannheim. Therefore ideologies are a 
permanent concept that will not disappear. Ideology is a mode of thought that “obscures the 
real condition of society” (Mannheim, 1954:36) in the interests of the ruling class. The 
concept of utopia adds to this static view of ideology the idea that certain oppressed groups 
are driven to destroy and transform a certain aspect of the society that only they can 
perceive, and the features of which contradict the social order. Hence, neither the dominant 
nor the dominated group sees the society as it really is. Ideological groups want to preserve 
the social order whereas the utopian seeks to change it; this represents the class struggle. 
(Mannheim, 1954:36) Mannheim differentiates between particular and total ideology. The 
particular only includes the psychological features of ideology on an individual level and lets 
the all-encompassing view of the world be a part of the total conception of ideology. The 
latter is considered a Weltanschauung that is adopted by certain groups and takes the ideas 
and thought-systems of a historical epoch into account. (Mannheim, 1954:49-51) After 
elaborating Mannheim’s theory of ideology the logical consequence is the potential 
existence of multiple ideologies. That is one difference between his and Marx’s theory. For 
Mannheim ideologies are an interdependent system of thinking that appear typically in 
social systems and cannot be traced back to the views of specific individuals. This pluralist 
potential of ideologies grows in importance in the evolving theories of ideology. 
4.1.3 Antonio Gramsci 
Following this discussion of Mannheim who, in many ways, was working outside Marxism, I 
shall now talk about the radical Italian Marxist theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937). His point of departure was the fact that the working class gives its support rather to 
Fascism and Nazism than to socialism. Socialist movements did not succeed in Europe until 
the beginning of the 20th century, but Fascism in Italy did. This indicates the inability of 
Marxists to understand the political realities of the time. Hence, Gramsci questions the 
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nature and role of ideology and politics in the historical process. He aims to re-establish the 
link between theory and practice that has been lost in Marxism, and re-interpret the 
historical materialism so that Marxism will play an important role in the historical process 
again. As with Marx and Engels, the class domination has its origins in the social relations of 
production. Gramsci is known for his concept of hegemony, the ideological dominance of 
cultural norms, values and beliefs of the dominant class over the dominated. Ideological 
hegemony can be performed by the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, by using both state 
force and cultural opportunity. By that he moves ideology away from being exclusively a 
state tool. For Gramsci, ideology is a specific “system of ideas” (Gramsci, 1971:376) or “a 
conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in 
all manifestations of individual and collective life” (Gramsci, 1971:328). Moreover, ideology 
gives framework for action. He extracts the aspect of the unity of faith in a world view and 
the corresponding rules of conduct from religion to explain ideology. Hence ideology is a 
unity between a Weltanschauung and its accompanying norm of conduct. (Gramsci, 
1971:326) Ideology is produced in the civil society (an ensemble of organisations commonly 
called private), particularly by the intellectuals who represent the leaders of the cultural 
sphere. Consequently hegemony cannot be performed only on the political level. Dominance 
on the cultural level is as well important. To make it more clear, after dominating the 
productive and political level the dominant class has to achieve hegemony on the moral and 
intellectual level. In order to attain this goal Gramsci chooses a sensitive approach by 
emphasising the coordination of different interests and their ideological expressions. A 
combination between aspects from several ideologies can be incorporated by an ideology so 
that in the best case the society as a whole is engaged and represented in the ideology, 
Gramsci calls this an organic ideology. (Gramsci, 1971:180-183) 
Gramsci’s contribution is particularly the broad political scope to which he applies his theory 
that turns the negative conception of ideology into a positive, by including moral and 
cultural norms and understandings. Moreover, his concept of ideology has a more concrete 
approach as he attempts to underpin his theory with practical experiences from real life. He 
linked recurring pattern of political thinking to evidence in the real world. This evidence for 
our thinking can be found in actions and behaviours. Like that ideologies can be traced in the 
everyday life and located in particular activities. (Rehmann, 2013:118) 
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4.1.4 Louis Althusser 
Louis Althusser outlines his understanding of ideology in his text Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses which is published as a chapter in the book Lenin and Philosophy and 
other Essays in 1970, translated to English in 1971. He begins by drawing on Marxism, 
pointing out the necessity of the reproduction of means of production to make societal 
survival possible. The reproduction of the conditions of production includes on the one hand 
the reproduction of the material conditions and on the other the reproduction of labour 
force. It is not sufficient to only provide material conditions (wages) to the labour force to 
ensure their reproduction, but rather education is also necessary. This can be achieved 
outside the production sector in the school system. There the workers learn to read, write 
and calculate. Besides, they get taught “rules of good behaviour”, “rules of morality” and 
“rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour” as well as the “rules of the order 
established by class domination” (Althusser, 1971:132). The workers are skilled but as well 
educated in the rules of the established order, hence the perpetuation of the obedience to 
the ruling ideology of the workers, and consequently the facility to manipulate the ideology 
in order to exploit the workers is secured. Therefore, the reproduction of labour force 
includes both reproduction of their skills and also their subjugation to the ruling ideology. In 
this sense, ideology facilitates the reproduction of labour skills, and the school system is the 
dominant ideological state apparatus. The state composes of an infrastructure (the 
economic base) and a superstructure (the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological 
State Apparatuses). The Repressive State Apparatus comprises the government, the police, 
the army etc. and functions by violence (and only secondarily by ideology), whereas the 
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) include the educational ISA, the religious ISA, the political 
ISA etc. The former belongs to the public domain and the latter for the most part to the 
private domain and functions by ideology (and only secondarily by violence). Each of the ISA 
can be seen as the realisation of an ideology. Those ideologies exist because of their 
subjection to the ruling ideology. Consequently, the ISA’s with all the contradictions make 
the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class. Ideologies do not consist of ideas and 
beliefs, but rather in the actions and practices of individuals who act according to their 
beliefs. He goes on by saying that there is no practice without ideology. Therefore ideologies 
are of permanent appearance. They are not a state which can be overcome as Marx said. For 
him ideology is material and not spiritual. Ideas are real because they are always based on 
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social practices and expressed in objective social forms like languages etc. (Althusser, 
1971:136-140 and 158) 
4.1.5 Freeden’s ideological morphology 
As outlined in this short introduction into political ideologies, the development from 
ideology to ideologies is apparent. Furthermore, the negative connotation of ideologies is 
more understandable now. The idea of ideology concealing the truth developed into the 
attachment of ideologies to social groups. Finally, Freeden tries to find out what we can take 
from these ideologies. 
According to Freeden (2003:32), 
“a political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinion, and values that 
(1)  exhibit a recurring pattern 
(2)  are held by significant groups 
(3)  compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy 
(4)  do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social 
and political arrangements and processes of a political 
community.” 
In order to unpack this definition, it is important to notice that repeating pattern implies 
traditions with staying power. Merely a short time appearance of ideologies does not help 
the cause of ideologies that arise to persist and develop further. Political institutions and 
practices that interconnect with the patterns have to be set up and sustained. Those 
patterns consist of a combination of political concepts that are filled with fundamental 
concepts just like liberty, equality or democracy and its various interpretations by society. 
The combination of political concepts and their relationship will determine the ideology. 
Therefore the meaning of an ideology cannot only be accessed by looking at the historical 
tradition of political discourse or cultural pluralism of the context but as well through the 
particular patterns of the political concepts. The organisation of the political concepts can be 
used in the morphological analysis, which focuses on the internal structure of ideologies. The 
patterns are flexible. (Freeden, 2003:51) 
The necessity that an ideology is held by significant groups refers to its contestability in a 
plural political world. As Mannheim notices, ideologies are a social product, but Althusser 
claims that ideologies get carried by conscious individuals. A certain number of (influential) 
people have to share the ideology, otherwise it cannot survive in the contentious political 
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world. The position of the producer of the ideology is not always easy to detect. Intellectuals 
are often pinpointed as the authors of an ideology but do not maintain a strong presence in 
the political world. Their significance can also be manifested in the ability to control the 
media, or being the spokesperson for politics. It represents more significance in relation to 
political ideology than the close connection to the means of production. Furthermore, such 
non-verbal communicative skills as advertising are important. In the end the level of the 
group’s significance depends on its importance for a society and the social support. 
(Freeden, 2003:33) 
The third characteristic of ideologies applies specifically to such political ideologies as with 
which this thesis is concerned. Aiming at the public arena and compiling macro-programmes 
are generally the goals of ideologies. (Freeden, 2003:34) 
The last characteristic describes the influence ideologies aim to have on politics and the 
public opinion. Ideologies justify their support by organising activities on which they apply 
methods between persuasion and propaganda. (Freeden, 2003:34) According to Freeden, 
ideologies must be analysed considering their idea-environment (“proximity”) (Freeden, 
2003:61) Each ideology consists of core and peripheral concepts. The core concept has the 
highest importance, while the peripheral concepts are only secondary (“priority”) (Freeden, 
2003:61). These concepts and the relations between them can change or evolve over time. 
They give the ideology their unique features. The morphological analysis tells us what 
ideology consists of and why a certain ideology prevails over others. Not only are the intra-
ideology relationships important, but also the inter-ideology relations (“proportionality”) 
(Freeden, 2003:64). There is a competition between and within ideologies. Therefore, 
ideologies change and evolve over time as well as the supremacy of an ideology. Hence, the 
struggle consists of the sovereignty of a socially legitimised meaning of political concepts and 
the maintenance of the same. (Freeden, 1996:77-78) Freeden adds, that the same political 
concept can have not only different levels of importance in various ideologies but 
furthermore even other meanings (“permeability”) (Freeden, 2003:63). 
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5.0 Methodologies 
This chapter aims to clarify the methods used in this thesis. The research agenda will be 
described to introduce the objectives of this text, as well as how to achieve them. First, I 
wish to present the methodological considerations and purpose of the research. Following 
these sections I will present the empirical data and finally this section, ends with an 
operationalisation of the theory of ideologies by Freeden, clarifying how the theory is 
applied in the analysis. 
5.1 Methodological considerations 
In this thesis, I have chosen to work with the theory of ideologies by Michael Freeden as my 
overall theoretical framework. As explained in the theoretical chapter (chapter 4), Freeden 
goes beyond the classical meaning of ideologies that describes them as static belief systems. 
Rather he argues that ideologies consist of several concepts whose meanings can change 
just like languages. The ideologies evolve according to their concepts. For Freeden ideologies 
get produced and consumed every day. This theoretical framework of ideologies offers the 
chance to dissect, in this case, the ideology of ISIS. This allows me to go beyond the labelling 
of groups with ideological concepts. The ideology of Jihadi-Salafism cannot be applied as a 
static concept to almost any radical or Jihadi organisations. That would impliy that the 
ideologies of al-Qaeda as well as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are exactly the same. Therefore, 
Freeden argues that ideologies (his examples are classic ideologies like Liberalism and 
Communism) can evolve while the concepts of which they consist develop. Freeden calls his 
type of analysis the morphology of ideologies. Breaking down the ideology into core and 
peripheral concepts is part of the analysis. This is essential in the analysis of the ideology of 
ISIS to discover its components. Only then I can link these components to the motivations of 
Europeans to become foreign fighters. 
5.2 Purpose of research 
The purpose of this thesis is primarily to answer the problem formulation of how the 
ideology of ISIS motivates the European foreign fighters to go to Syria and join it. Besides, as 
outlined in the literature review (chapter 2) the ideology of ISIS needs further attention and 
research. Such extant texts as there are have a lack of in-depth studies. The few studies that 
have been published so far on ISIS’s ideology, focus on the ideology of Jihadi-Salafism but do 
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not elaborate further on the specific aspects the ideology of ISIS shows. This thesis aims to 
close this gap. Moreover, Freeden’s theory of ideologies seems not to have been previously 
used in this field. This thesis positions itself in this ongoing debate about ISIS and its goals 
and adds the aspect of foreign fighters. The link between the foreign fighters, and more 
specifically their motivations, with the ideology of the organisation to which they affiliate 
themselves is a new contribution to the literature, or to put it differently, it has not been 
made yet. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the literature on foreign fighters as well. 
Research on the subject of the motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters with ISIS 
is still necessarily in its embryonic stages because of current and ongoing character, and the 
consequent lack of reliable data. 
5.3 Case study 
This thesis will be concerned with the case of ISIS. Whilst working with this specific case it 
will enable me to understand the current situation in Syria and Iraq while parts are under 
ISIS’s rule. A case study is an in-depth, contextual examination of a specific phenomenon 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006:219). Thus, its purpose is not to find a universal explanation but rather to 
clarify the reality of a specific case (Bryman, 2012:68-69). I am aware that a criticism of case 
studies is that they are too subjective and do not represent an objective view (Flyvbjerg, 
2006:234). Bias and subjectivism is a risk in all methods and not only to case studies. I 
believe that rather no knowledge exists without subjective influence, or portrays an 
exclusively objective perspective. I therefore argue, in line with Flyvbjerg (2006) that a 
certain viewpoint always exists in constructing research. In this sense I claim that context-
bound research is more valuable than the endless search for universal explanations 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006:224). 
I chose the case of ISIS out of interest. Firstly, because of its current character, and the 
enormous stream of foreign fighters which this Jihadi organisation has attracted. In fact it is 
the largest foreign fighters’ mobilisation in a Muslim majority country since 1945. 
(Neumann, 2015) Therefore, ISIS represents the most valuable case in studying foreign 
fighters. The large number of Europeans who have become foreign fighters for ISIS offers the 
opportunity to investigate their motivations on a large scale. Secondly, the ideology of ISIS 
lacks research. According to Freeden, labelling of a group’s ideology with a (classic) ideology 
like Salafism or Jihadism is not sufficient. The features of the ideology have to be dismantled. 
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ISIS represents an interesting case in which to investigate an ideology in-depth. The 
particular concepts of their ideology have to be outlined to create a full picture of the 
ideology. 
5.4 Empirical data 
This section outlines and critically assesses the collection of data and the empirical 
framework. I gathered the empirical data by means of the so called snowball-method where 
one source leads to the next (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Thereby, it creates a great 
volume of knowledge and allows the view of the problem area from several perspectives. 
Thus, I was able to grasp the whole complexity of the problem area as far as possible. 
In this thesis I will use the approach of data triangulation as case studies ask for both 
quantitative and qualitative data (Bryman, 2012:68). Data triangulation is defined as “[…] a 
process of verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and 
methods” (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012:156). It is a common argument that one type of data 
compensates for the weakness of the other. Hence, by combining both methods, this thesis 
seeks to be strengthened by gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the problem 
formulation. 
5.4.1 Qualitative and quantitative data 
This section aims to clarify both qualitative and quantitative data due to the fact that much 
data draws on qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data includes the interviews I 
have conducted, as well as texts, articles and reports from academic scholars, journalists and 
think tanks. Moreover, the material published by ISIS itself will be considered. This material 
includes videos, speeches and magazines, mostly published by Al Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s 
main propaganda centre. Hence primary and secondary data will be assessed. Quantitative 
data consists mostly of the statistics published by the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)36 and the Munich Security Conference 2015. In 
the following, I will list some of my qualitative data; the propaganda magazine Dabiq and 
way of proceeding with my interviews. 
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 The ICSR is an independent organisation and was launched in 2008 at the King’s College London. 
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5.4.1.1 Dabiq 
The Al Hayat Media Center publishes the propaganda magazine Dabiq. Since June 2014 nine 
editions have been published. Every edition treats one main topic plus several reports 
afterwards. Pictures are a very important feature in all editions. They serve to underline the 
context or tell their own stories. The most important editions for this thesis are The return of 
the Khilafah, A call to hijrah, The failed crusade, Remaining and Expanding (all 2014) and 
From Hypocrisy to Apostasy, They plot and Allah plots (both 2015). The magazine portrays 
ISIS as they see themselves and how they would like to be seen by the world: presenting 
their victories and emphasising the positive picture of the caliphate. I extracted the editions 
from the Clarion Project homepage which has collected all of them. 
5.4.1.2 Interviews 
I chose the in-depth interview as another data collection method that allows collecting big 
amount of data in a short time (Marshall and Rossmann, 2006:101). Due to the lack of data, 
interviews were an ideal opportunity to gain a detailed insight into the topic. To tackle the 
issue that in-depth interviews are not generalizable I chose this as one of a number of 
methods (Boyce and Neale, 2006:4). These “conversations with a purpose” (Marshall and 
Rossmann, 2006:101) are much more like conversations than formal events. This creates a 
more trustworthy atmosphere. That is why I conducted the interviews mostly in quiet public 
places as well as one in the interviewee’s institution. Moreover, I have conducted two 
interviews via telephone to accommodate the practical difficulties of the interviewee to 
meet me in person. Regarding the aspect of positionality; in line with Kim England (1994:84-
85) I acknowledge, that “the researcher is an instrument in his/her research”. My 
participation during the personal interviews was always visible. As an obvious outsider (a 
woman with no particular religious conviction) I could pose questions, to a certain degree, 
Muslims could not have asked. The outsider role allowed me to ask questions about the 
practices in Islam and certain interpretations just like Jihadism or violence. I could pose 
direct questions regarding the practices and behaviour that are particular for Jihadis. I would 
not be expected to know every detail about Islam and its different interpretations as a 
Muslim most definitely would have been. 
I selected the interview partners regarding their involvement into the topic. Having 
conducted the first, it was led to the next as the interviewees suggested further interview 
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partners. I contacted and selected potential interviewees myself. All interviewees have or 
had contact with foreign fighters, mainly those from Denmark as this is where the interviews 
were conducted. One interviewee went to Syria to speak to fighters there and could 
therefore offer valuable on-site-information. 
From the various interview formats I chose the general interview guide approach, and in 
particular the interview guide which is more structured than the informal, conversational 
interview format (Marshall and Rossmann, 2006:101). It enabled me to prepare a structured 
draft of my interview guide. Nevertheless, I allowed myself the flexibility to adapt the 
interview questions to the particular interview partner. I acknowledge the lack of 
consistency and its risk, but argue in line with Marshall and Rossmann (2006) that the same 
general areas of information should be maintained in every interview but flexibility allows 
the researcher to get the necessary information. I decided to pose open-ended and neutral 
questions in order to allow my interview partner to tell their story and not restrict them by 
posing leading questions. Furthermore, I posed follow-up questions to clarify a statement, 
receive more information, confirm that the question had been correctly understood, or even 
in the case that the question had not been answered. (Turner, 2010:758) In case of the 
personal interviews I recorded the conversation after receiving the permission of the 
interview partners. I took notes while conducting the telephone interviews to gather as 
much information as possible and accurately record the wording of the interviewee. 
5.4.2 Critical assessment of the empirical framework 
In the following I intend to critically reflect upon my empirical data. While using the 
snowball-method, I am aware of the necessity to check and question the origin of the data. I 
sought to do so by following the critical perspective on sources by Vibeke Ankersborg. 
According to her, it is essential to view the material because it is written by persons 
(Ankersborg, 2007:16). By applying this method, the transparency of the data collection 
process will be increased. This approach is particularly important while analysing the 
propaganda material. 
Viewing the propaganda material of ISIS is a challenging task. Keeping an objective 
perspective is essential but difficult to maintain when seeing the brutality in the videos. 
Furthermore, the origin of the material is difficult to verify the publisher is not always 
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mentioned. Additionally the pictures shown in this kind of videos are not always verifiable. 
(Turner, 2012) Apart from the verification of propaganda material, ISIS paints a one-sided 
picture of their victories and achievements, never the losses or weaknesses, and this must 
be kept in mind while viewing the material. Moreover, the testimonies of returnees can only 
be checked to a certain extent. The statements regarding happenings in Syria are commonly 
not verifiable. Nevertheless, the propaganda material stands as an important point in this 
thesis because of its meaning in the context of ISIS’s ideology. Although not every event or 
picture can be verified, the material shows important insights into the Jihadi group. The 
propaganda material aims to recruit and attract fighters but moreover to create a picture of 
themselves as a group which is capable of leading a state. The combination of brutality and 
normality in the material illustrates simultaneously power over and care for their citizens. 
5.4 Operationalisation 
This section aims to clarify the methods used in the analysis. Before finally answering the 
problem formulation, two analytical steps are necessary. The first is to analyse the 
motivations of the Europeans to become foreign fighters. For this purpose I analyse the 
conducted interviews and the reports and group the motivations discussed. In the 
theoretical chapter it was clarified that Freeden analyses ideologies in a morphological way. 
That means that ideologies are not static but evolve over time as the meaning of their 
concepts also changes. With this in mind, I shall carry out the second step of the analysis, 
wherein the morphology of ISIS’s ideology is unpacked. I will elaborate on the ideology, 
identifying their goals (core concept) and also the strategies (peripheral concept) they use to 
achieve these. During the analysis, I will examine ISIS’s English speaking magazine Dabiq, 
evaluate the interviews I conducted and texts published by academics and think tanks. I will 
follow Freeden’s system to dismantle the ideology and apply its composition of political 
concepts. After identifying the goals and methods of ISIS, the final step will link the 
motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters to these. In order to answer my 
problem formulation I need to explore the possible connection between the ideology of ISIS 
and the motivations of the Europeans to become foreign fighters. Therefore, I will apply the 
grouping of chapter 6.2 in the analysis, checking if these motivations are reflected in the 
ideology. To increase the clarity and transparency of the analysis, both the previously 
applied categorisations regarding the motivations (identity and affiliation, boredom and help 
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and support) and the ideology (state building and expansion, eschatology and hijrah and 
jihad) will be maintained. Only if the goals and methods of ISIS correspond to the 
motivations and needs of Europeans to become foreign fighters, will I be able to render 
plausible the position that the ideology plays a major factor in joining ISIS and how so. 
 
6.0 European foreign fighters 
The outbreak of the Syrian civil war brought attention to foreign fighters because of the 
growing number of Europeans leaving for Syria. First, this section will elaborate on the 
(European) foreign fighter’s involvement in Syria. Second, it will focus on the motivations of 
Europeans to become foreign fighters to join ISIS. Due to a lack of statistics about which 
organisation fighters join, I will refer to the total amount of foreign fighters and argue in line 
with the ICSR that most of the foreign fighters join ISIS. (Carter, Maher and Neumann, 
2014:11) It will not examine the differences between foreign fighters and home grown 
terrorism as this is beyond the scope of this thesis.37 
6.1 The foreign fighting in Syria 
Although transnational insurgencies (foreign fighters) had existed for centuries (as an 
example the Soviet-Afghan war), the political scientists had not yet recognised them as a 
distinct phenomenon, as was made evident by the lack of an existing term for it. According 
to David Malet’s research (2013), the term foreign fighter only gained more popularity when 
the Americans guaranteed a safe way out of the Battle of Kunduz (2001) to thousands of 
local Afghan Taliban fighters who surrendered. In contrast, the foreign fighters were 
imprisoned. The distinction between national and transnational combatants was highlighted, 
and their appearance in popular newspapers from then on was ensured (another 102 times 
during 2002). The invasion of Iraq made sure that the term foreign fighter would remain in 
the public’s discourse as the use of the term increased in newspapers. The day after the 
invasion, Malet counted the term 660 times in the major world newspapers and over 1000 
times in each following year. The term foreign fighter has thus developed into a commonly 
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 See Hegghammer, T (2013): Should I stay or should I go?. 
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accepted concept. (Malet, 2013:217) Between 2010 and 2015 the widely acknowledged 
definition originates from Thomas Hegghammer who builds on David Malet: 
“[…] a foreign fighter [is] an agent who (1) has joined, and operates 
within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the 
conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lack affiliation 
to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid” (Hegghammer, 
2010a:57-58). 
This definition stands out due to its exclusion of other violent actors who cross borders, 
which is a distinction that usually falls by the wayside. Criterion 1 distinguishes the foreign 
fighters from international terrorists who operate globally. It refers to the distinction 
between global and local Jihadism. Foreign fighters do not engage in out-of-area combats 
but fight in one conflict zone at a time. Criterion 2 excludes exiled rebels and persons who 
return to their homeland after having lived elsewhere for whatever reason. Criterion 3 rules 
out any soldiers who are generally paid to go wherever their commander sends them, and 
finally, criterion 4 excludes mercenaries who go wherever it is most profitable for them. It is 
however necessary to add that the identity differs in many cases from the citizenship. A 
fighter might be attached to a region which is not within the borders of his nationality as 
indicated by his passport. Mendelsohn calls it a different level of “foreignness” (Mendelsohn, 
2011:192). Different identity markers such as province of origin, ethnic group or tribe can 
change the individual level of “foreignness” (Mendelsohn, 2011:192). I refrain from taking 
this into consideration because it would make the search for a commonly acknowledged 
definition almost impossible. The term foreign fighter indicates the involvement of the 
persons in combat. In the case of Syria, the lack of statistics means that I cannot distinguish 
between those who leave Europe to fight and those who do so to provide humanitarian aid. 
In 2013 the ICSR published data on the number of foreign fighters who have left for Syria. In 
January 2015 they revised the numbers upwards from around 11,000 to 20,730, one fifth of 
whom came from Europe. Although I acknowledge that the vast majority is from Muslim 
countries, I nevertheless focus on the fighters coming from Europe.38 The numbers shown in 
illustration 1 are total numbers based on data from the second half of 2014, referring to 
travellers during the entire conflict since 2011. Reliable data is available from 14 European 
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 Muslim countries are defined as nations or regions where the majority (at least 50%) of the population 
belongs to the Islam. 
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countries. The calculated 4,000 European fighters are almost double the estimations from 
December 2013. The largest European countries, Germany, France and the UK, have 
contributed the highest absolute figures, while Denmark, Belgium and Sweden have the 
highest numbers when expressed as a proportion of their population. On these calculations, 
the number of foreign fighters in the conflict in Syria and Iraq exceeds that in Afghanistan in 
the 1980’s and is therefore the largest mobilisation of foreign fighters in a Muslim majority 
country since 1945. (Neumann, 2015) Statements about which group they join in Syria are 
vague. According to the ICSR estimations the majority joins either Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS. 
(Carter, Maher and Neumann, 2014:11) There is furthermore the possibility that not all of 
the persons joined an organisation. Included in the 4000 Europeans is everybody who left for 
Syria, hence they do not necessarily have to be still in Syria, nor even alive (Zelin, 2013). The 
EU justice commissioner, Vera Jourova, estimates 5000 to 6000 Europeans have joined ISIS. 
According to her, the largest single contingent is from France, 1450 persons (Gonzales, 
2015). These two numbers show that it is extremely difficult to measure the foreign fighters’ 
participation in ISIS. This is particularly so in Syria and Iraq, because the conflict is ongoing 
and more and more fighters join almost every day. The age range is between 18 and 29, 
much younger than the usual age of foreign fighters. In Afghanistan the age lay between 25 
and 35. 6% of them are converts to Islam, most of them second or third generation migrants 
to Europe, and 18% are women. Additionally, only a small number of them has had a prior 
connection to Syria. (Barrett, 2014:16) These numbers vary significantly between the 
sources; therefore a demographic or socio-economic profile is difficult to establish. Although 
there have been studies and attempts to profile foreign fighters by looking into their 
backgrounds39, still there is no reliable data from every country. 
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 See Per Gudmundson’s study The Swedish foreign fighter contingent in Syria of 18 out of 30 Swedish foreign 
fighters (late 2013) by assessing their real names, social security numbers, criminal records, ethnicities, regional 
distribution and socioeconomic background.  
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Illustration 1: Foreign fighters flow to Syria 
 
(Source: Sharma, S, 2015) 
 
As shown categorising foreign fighters is difficult due to a lack of information. What is certain 
is that this conflict has an appeal for Europeans that motivates them to leave their lives and 
go to Syria. But what kind of motivations do they have? Understanding the motivations is 
essential to keep going with this thesis. In the following I will investigate the reasons and 
motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters. 
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6.2 Motivations of Europeans to leave for Syria 
Much has been published on the motivations for Europeans to leave their home country and 
go abroad to fight; not that much yet on the current foreign fighters flow to Syria. Scholars, 
newspapers and politicians have all engaged in topic. I will draw on academic literature as 
well the interviews I conducted. Major contributors will be, among others, Aaron Zelin’s text 
Foreign Fighter Motivations, as well as Richard Barrett’s Foreign Fighters in Syria and Foreign 
Fighters from David Malet. The motivations differ from case to case but there are common, 
recognisable features which I want to carve out in the following part. The motivations can be 
of social, economic or political nature. An accumulation of motivations on a micro and macro 
level seem to be decisive. 
Typology of foreign fighters leads to an oversimplification of the issue. Therefore, I refrain 
from categorising, but rather group the factors repeatedly mentioned by the foreign fighters 
themselves as well as in the personally conducted interviews and academic literature. I will 
group these motivations into identity and affiliation, boredom, and the duty to help and 
support their fellow Muslims. 
6.2.1 Identity and affiliation 
A significant proportion of the young Muslims in European countries have problems building 
up their own identity. They are integrated into the host society to a degree that they no 
longer feel a part of their parents’ society anymore, but still not sufficiently accepted by the 
society in which they live. The Danish social worker, Khaterah Parwani, gives an example: In 
Denmark “integration means becoming Danish” (Khaterah Parwani), hence it is harder for 
the Muslims to become accepted into the society. According to Fatih Alev, the imam who 
works in a prison as well as in Katalysator, the networking and advisory centre in 
Copenhagen for young people who want to leave the radical community, young Muslims 
leave their home countries 
“due to the way the media and politicians have debated Islam and 
Muslims which is almost always or very consistently in a negative 
way. So this pushes the young Muslims of Denmark who grew up 
here away and excludes them from the Danish society. So they 
cannot identify themselves with the Danish society” (Fatih Alev). 
40 
 
Consequently, the example of Denmark shows that the integration into European societies 
for young Muslims is in many cases very difficult. Of course, there are also success stories. 
This lack of identification with either either of the two societies triggers a search for a 
community. Particularly the socially excluded people who might have experienced 
socioeconomic disadvantages or discrimination are sensitive to this argument. They are 
seeking acceptance and a more welcoming environment. The reconstruction of the ummah 
in one place plays a major role here. The feeling of exclusion and having less chance in life 
than their fellow citizens are strong motivations for Europeans to become foreign fighters. It 
is a reaction to an environment young people perceive as demanding, complex and 
inequitable, combined with the hope of finding people who understand them or have had 
similar experiences. (Coolsaet, 2015:17) 
Closely connected to this issue is the problem of failure. Although there have not been any 
in-depth socio-economic studies yet, it has been indicated that the foreign fighters from 
Europe do face a precarious livelihood. A significant portion of the foreign fighters are 
people who failed in their lives in Europe. They have only part-time work if they are 
employed at all, are not doing well at school or have dropped out and are socially excluded. 
(Coolsaet, 2015:18; Khaterah Parwani; Satnam Singh) They are considered to be losers and 
“that is the only way they get status and be somebody” (Nagieb Khaja). This failure can be 
educational, social or economic. They see travelling to Syria as their only way out, and as an 
opportunity to achieve something. Exclusion and the search for an identity are motivations 
not only for migrated Muslims but also for converts. Ethnic origin is not, however, the major 
push factor, but rather their circumstances and environment, which accounts for why in 
most cases their brothers or sisters do not join ISIS. (Kardaş, T and Özdemir, Ö, 2014:11) 
These people seek a meaning and want replies to the big questions in life. This search for 
identity, dignity, meaning and community including the perceived discrimination in 
European countries facilitate the susceptibility to militant thoughts and increases the risk of 
leaving for Syria. Their questions lead them to seek the answers from religion. Although a 
proportion of the foreign fighters come from very religious families, the majority “does not 
practise Islam at home” (Khaterah Parwani). Therefore, the parents cannot answer their 
religious questions and are in any case not the first persons the young people would 
approach. Additionally, the imams in many countries do not speak the country’s language 
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which makes it more difficult for young people to consult them. (Fatih Alev) Consequently, 
most use the internet and particularly social media to find answers. Jihadi groups like ISIS are 
very active online and spread their propaganda successfully. The Jihadist groups are aware 
of these problems the younger generation have and take advantage of them. 
6.2.2 Boredom 
Boredom can be a motivation to go to Syria. People who mention this as their motivation are 
looking for a thrill; Jakob Sheikh calls them “jihad tourists”. “They cross the border, get 
pictures taken with Kalashnikovs and then they go back” (Jakob Sheikh). The escape of the 
daily routine and the search for an adventure are in the focus of these foreign fighters.40 
Nevertheless, not all of these tourists go back right away as the video Le quotidien de 
jihadistes en Syrie (The daily lives of Jihadists in Syria) shows. Thrill seekers stay and fulfil 
their appetite for adventures and new experiences (Kardaş, T and Özdemir, Ö, 2014:12). 
Apart from those who simply want to experience more action in their lives, there are also 
criminals who are escaping a prison sentence or have already crossed the line of killing 
(Coolsaet, 2015:17). The main difference between the fighters who leave out of boredom 
and the criminals is the level of violence they have experienced at home. Criminals are 
commonly familiar with weapons and violent actions. As an example Store A alias 
Abderozzak Benarabe, a gang leader in Copenhagen, who joined the fight against the regime 
of Assad in 2012. He needs no introduction into how to use a gun and is used to violence 
according to Nagieb Khaja, the documentarist who followed him to Syria in order to make a 
documentary with him (Khaja, 2014). 
6.2.3 Help and support 
The reply of Amer Deghayes, a British foreign fighter in Syria, to the question about his goal 
in this revolution:  
“[The goal is] to fight in the path of Allah, to remove the Bashir al-
Assad regime, and to protect the Muslims. The aim is to remove the 
oppression and hopefully to implement Islam and the Islamic justice. 
But then you find the west they would say [the Islam] is a threat to 
their superpower, because as you can see the west and their choice 
of Capitalism causes a lot of injustice. So if people see the light of 
                                                          
40
 See BFMTV (2014): Le quotidien de Jihadistes français en Syrie. 
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Islam and the justice of Islam that would cause the spread of it and 
that’s something they wouldn’t want.”41 
This statement shows two reasons: the solidarity with other Muslims, and the construction 
of an Islamic state where Islamic justice governs. The former aspect, as well as the toppling 
of the Assad regime, describes the motivation of the first foreign fighters who went to Syria 
mostly in 2011 and 2012 when the civil war broke out. The latter turned later into a major 
motivation when the caliphate had been announced and the dream of an Islamic state (the 
goal almost every radical group had but never achieved) becomes reality. (Jakob Sheikh) 
The change of the regime was one of the causes for the uprising in the first place. The more 
violent the conflict has become and brutal the actions of Assad’s regime against the rebels, 
combined with the lack of support from the West, the more motivated have the fighters 
been to go to Syria and contribute to the desired regime change. Not everybody left to fight, 
some instead went to provide humanitarian aid. The aspect in Salafism about the obligation 
of Muslims to help their fellow Sunni Muslim brothers and sisters all over the world became 
apparent. Whenever the Muslim community is under attack and they cannot defend 
themselves Muslims have to help them wherever they are. This duty was newly interpreted 
by first Sayyid Qutb and later Abdallah Azzam. Hence the responsibility of engagement lies in 
the hand of everybody; it is the duty of every individual. Therefore, every Muslim has to 
participate for the sake of their-own salvation. Nobody can assume this duty on behalf of 
another, no matter where they live or what they do. The collective duty becomes an 
individual duty. This crucial breakaway was formulated by Abdallah Azzam in his book The 
Defence of Muslim Lands, the first obligation after Imam (1979). (Briggs and Silverman, 
2014:14; Barrett, 2014:18) 
Therefore, this motivation was originally a reaction to the brutality and massacres of the 
Assad regime against the Sunni Muslim population, but has turned into the hope of 
establishing an Islamic state. While the conflict has turned more and more into a sectarian 
war, the European Muslims feel the necessity to support their fellow Sunnis. In each country, 
Syria and Iraq, the government was not Sunni led. The majority Sunni Muslim Syrian 
population has been oppressed by the Alawite Assad. Alawites follow a branch of the Shia 
Islam. The support from the Shia Iranian government, the Lebanese Hezbollah (Shia Islam) 
                                                          
41
 See Khaja, N and Greenwood, T (2015): Western Jihadis in Syria. 
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and other Iraqi Shia organisations of the Assad regime does not contribute to the de-
escalation. The widely disseminated images of the brutality against Sunni Muslims evoked an 
emotional reaction in the foreign fighters. Moreover, most of the foreign fighters feel that 
western governments are not helping their brothers and sisters in the Middle East, so that 
they have to show solidarity with them and fight the Assad regime. The mere condemnation 
of Assad’s actions by western governments was not sufficient in the eyes of Syrians, the 
foreign fighters or the humanitarian workers because it did not help to stop the government, 
and no military support was sent. Frustration is therefore also a motivation; frustration 
about the western governments who, according to the Sunni Muslims, do nothing to help 
them. The European governments consider action, but even after the evidence of use of 
chemical weapons by Assad, most of the governments did nothing more than talk. (Zelin, 
2015:3) 
The implementation of an Islamic state, or caliphate, as noted above, is another motivation 
for the foreign fighters. They perceive it an honour to be part of a battle which was 
prophesied 1400 years ago by several hadith (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) that 
call Syria the land of jihad. A battle between Muslim armies will take place there, and lead to 
the end of times. It gives a good opportunity to fighters to die as martyrs since extremist 
sheikhs (Islamic leader or cleric) promise a better afterlife for those who die fighting the 
‘infidel’ enemy. (Barrett, 2014:18) 
Most importantly, it must be acknowledged that the reasons why foreign fighters go to Syria 
are not necessarily fixed. They can change over time, especially once they have arrived and 
stayed there for a while. Humanitarian motivations can turn into sectarian convictions; 
ideological zeal turns to disappointment when expectations are not been fulfilled. Moreover, 
the motivations are without strict delineation and overlap. For example, the identity issue is 
closely connected to the wish to belong to a community. 
Having named the reasons why foreign fighters join radical organisations in Syria, I will go on 
to analyse the ideology of ISIS. In that section, I will examine if the motivations correspond 
with the ideology. This step is necessary in order to investigate the research question. 
Linking the motivational factors to the ideology can give further details about the relevance 
of ideology in the process of leaving Europe for Syria to fight. 
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7.0 The ideology of ISIS 
As mentioned above, ISIS’s ideology has not been studied comprehensively. Considering the 
current character and complexity of that topic and due to a lack of academic literature, it is 
necessary to include as much expert knowledge as possible, as well as the openly available 
sources from ISIS itself to analyse ISIS’s ideology. The changing and evolving character of 
ideology as described by Freeden must always be kept in mind. It cannot be explained with a 
static definition of a terminology. Therefore, Jihadi-Salafism will serve as a foundation on 
which I shall build up the distinct aspects of ISIS’s ideology. Before doing so, I will start with a 
short introduction about the rise of ISIS. A common misperception that circulates in the 
media is that ISIS appeared out of nowhere, especially when it captured Mosul in a very 
short time. This perception is incorrect. In order to argue this statement I shall first outline 
the emergence of ISIS. Afterwards, a short section about the most important ideologues 
adds background to the story of the emergence of ISIS. I have picked the most well-known 
names of the ideologues since they commonly have a nom de guerre and a given name. 
7.1 The rise of ISIS 
Before examining the history of ISIS, I wish to start with a short explanation of my decision to 
use ISIS as an acronym rather than IS. ISIS has changed its name several times in the past 
years. ISIS is the acronym for Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. In common Arabic al-Sham 
refers to only Syria. That is why the name Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is regularly used as 
well. The organisation changed its name once more in June 2014 when it proclaimed the 
caliphate. Its official name is Islamic State, short IS. The reason why I use ISIS in this text is 
simple. ISIS is implying with its new name that it is the only Islamic state in the world. This 
ignores the various different ways to build and govern an Islamic state. ISIS considers itself as 
the only true Islamic state, despite Afghanistan and Iran also being Islamic states. In my 
opinion, to use IS as their official name would give credence to their approach of creating an 
Islamic state by proclamation. Furthermore ISIS most accurately describes the organisation’s 
activities since it holds territory in those two countries, Iraq and Syria. 
The radical organisation ISIS has its origins in a group called Jama’at al Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) 
founded in 1999 by the Jordanian Abu Musa’b al-Zarqawi (1966-2006) with the purpose of 
fighting the Jordanian government (Zelin, 2014:1). As he was the chief ideologue of ISIS it is 
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worth taking a closer look at his life history. Committing petty crimes in his earlier years he 
went to Afghanistan to fight the Afghan state following the Soviet withdrawal. To gain 
experience in weapons and fighting he visited a Jihadi training camp where he met Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the key ideologues in contemporary Jihadism. In 1993 al-
Zarqawi was imprisoned for his possession of weapons and explosives. During the six years 
he spent in prison his ideological views changed. While spending a significant amount of 
time with al-Maqdisi, he learned to emphasise the importance of lived piety over theological 
knowledge. The significance of practicing the ideas and not just knowing it in theory is one 
important idea of ISIS today and closely related to Wahhabism. After being released from 
prison al-Zarqawi set up a training camp in Afghanistan. Although supported by al-Qaeda the 
training camp belonged to al-Zarqawi. (Saltman and Winter, 2014:28) 
Al-Zarqawi continued to lead JTJ until 2004, when he pledged full allegiance to al-Qaeda, 
having been assisted by them until then. He renamed the group the al-Qaeda Organisation in 
the Land of Two Rivers, known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi stuck to 
his individual ideological agenda. This allegiance was purely strategic in nature. Al-Zarqawi 
needed the funding by al-Qaeda and therefore subordination was necessary. Over the next 
few years AQI terrorised the region with kidnapping, suicide operations and beheadings. The 
operation was directed against foreign and government workers as well as Shia Muslims 
(bombing of Shia mosques), aiming to destabilise the region and create chaos. After al-
Zarqawi’s death by an air strike, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with Abu-Bakr al-
Baghdadi) became the appointed leader. (Saltman and Winter, 2014:28-30) The final break 
between ISIS and al-Qaeda happened in 2014 when Ayman al-Zawahiri announces that ISIS 
“is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group […] does not have an organizational relationship with 
it and [al-Qaeda] is not the group responsible for their action” (Sly, 2014).  
After the death of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi in 2010, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed leadership 
of the Iraq-based organisation, a position he continues to hold today. In April 2013, Abu-Bakr 
al-Baghdadi created a group called the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) by announcing 
the merger with the militant organisation Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Syria. JN’s leader rejected 
the merger publicly and pledged allegiance directly to al-Zawahiri. This dispute developed 
into a bloody conflict, including the kidnapping of Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader in the province of 
al-Raqqa (Syria). (al-‘Ubaydi et al., 2014:16) 
46 
 
Despite the tumultuous history between ISIS and the Sunni Arabs including other militant 
Sunni groups, ISIS gained their support in Iraq when al-Maliki’s politics drifted more and 
more into political sectarianism. The chaos and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime by the 
US military produced disillusioned and embittered people who lost their job from one day to 
the next (military and state officials) and who wanted neither to live under a Shia 
government nor with the US troops in the country. The introduction of political sectarianism 
into the constitution in Iraq in 2005, forced displacement of people because of their religious 
affiliation burdened the relations between Sunni and Shia Arabs. The Iraqi government was 
considered to have close relations with the Iranian Shia government, thus, Sunni Muslims 
turned to ISIS. Peaceful demonstrations in December 2012 for political reform in Iraq were 
ended forcefully one year later, which triggered a violent answer of the protestors in the 
Anbar province. The government was expelled as it had been in other parts of Iraq. ISIS 
arrived in the beginning of 2014 to support their fellow Sunni Arabs, invited or uninvited is 
not clear, but the Sunni Muslims turned against ISIS and tried to gain control over Ramadi 
and Fallujah again, without success. (al-‘Ubaydi et al., 2014:21-24) 
Throughout 2013 and 2014, ISIS managed to gain territory in Syria and built up its base in 
Raqqa. Despite some counterattacks, the group was able to control the areas. 
Empowerment of their allies and destruction of their enemies as well as creation of an 
extremely violent reputation is their success recipe for effective control. In June 2014, ISIS 
overran Mosul and captured Iraq’s second biggest city in four days without major resistance. 
ISIS took control over almost one third of the country (see illustration 2). (Friedland, 
2015:11) After the uprising in Syria in 2011, ISIS infiltrated the country and took advantage 
of the power and security vacuums the fading influence of the dictatorship left behind. The 
takeover of Syrian territory was extremely well strategically planned by the main strategist 
and a very important man in the ranks of ISIS, known by his nom de guerre Haji Bakr (Samir 
Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi). (Reuter, 2015:24) 
On 29 June 2014, the first day of Ramadan, ISIS declared itself a caliphate with al-Baghdadi 
as Caliph Ibrahim. ISIS announced that all Muslims throughout the world should be loyal to 
him. The name was changed to Islamic State. (Friedland, 2015:11) 
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Illustration 2: Territorial distribution in Syria and Iraq (18.05.2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: BBC, 2015) 
7.2 The ideologues of ISIS 
After having introduced al-Zarqawi above, this section presents only the most important 
ideologues of ISIS due to the limited scale of the thesis. I begin by presenting Haji Bakr who 
was the head strategist of ISIS. Al-Baghdadi is a key figure due to his position as the leader of 
the group. Furthermore Abu Muhammad al-Adnani will be presented because of his decisive 
position as the official spokesman and one of the key ideologues of ISIS. 
7.2.1 Haji Bakr 
The Iraqi born Haji Bakr was a senior Ba’athist ex-army officer who had gained an important 
position in ISI. After the removal of the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein by the US army in 
2003, many Ba’athists joined ISI. Since 2011 the influence of the Ba’athists decreased but 
personalities like Haji Bakr, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (deputy leader of ISIS in Iraq) or Adnan 
Ismail Najm Abdullah al-Dulaimi (ISIS’s military chief) remained important. They all died in 
2014. A significant part of the leadership of ISIS met in Camp Bucca (a former US detention 
camp), just like Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi. (Barrett, 2014a:19) Haji Bakr was the head 
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strategist of ISIS and a very valuable figure for al-Baghdadi. He was the person who 
appointed him and convinced the other members that he should become the leader of ISI in 
2010. Although al-Baghdadi was the leader, he depended on Haji Bakr’s logistical planning 
skills. He was the one who drafted the plan to move into Syria and recruit people, mainly 
other foreigners, for an army. This daring plan had the one big advantage of invisibility. In 
the following years he managed to attract fighters in the abandoned, mostly uncontrolled, 
Northern Syria. Many Islamists settled down there to fight the regime and for the ‘true 
Islam’. Haji Bakr ordered the Iraqi member of ISI to stay in Iraq in order not to lose their 
influence there. The subjugation of Northern Syria followed Haji Bakr’s strict plan. First was 
the implementation of dawah offices, Islamic missionary centres, with the goal of recruiting 
a handful of people who were to spy out their towns. They were to find out about the 
powerful families, the names of the most powerful members of these families and their 
sources of income. Then, they were to report the names and number of members of the 
rebel groups in the town, as well as the names of the leaders who control them, and their 
political orientation. Finally, they were to investigate their illegal activities according to 
sharia (such as homosexuality, secret affairs or criminal activities) so that ISIS could perhaps 
use this information to blackmail them in the future. The infiltration of these towns and the 
penetration of the powerful families by ISIS’s members were to be guaranteed by marrying 
the daughters of those families. (Reuter, 2015:23-30) This precise plan of conquering Syrian 
regions shows the strategic capabilities of Haji Bakr and his immense value for al-Baghdadi. 
In this or a very similar manner the conquest proceeded and succeeded. 
7.2.2 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
Little is known for sure about the current leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He does not 
have any known record either as a leading figure or fighter, and his role in AQI was rather 
passive. Nonetheless he spent some time in Camp Bucca because the US army suspected 
him of being a supporter of al-Qaeda. Most likely he met other now high ranked Jihadis of 
ISIS in the camp. Apart from those facts, the life history of the leader of ISIS remains 
unknown. Interestingly, ISIS presents complete curriculum vitae for al-Baghdadi that claims 
he has experience in leading military operations and is a studied imam with a PhD in 
education. (SITE Intelligence Group, 2014) These claims cannot be verified, which gives al-
Baghdadi an air of mystery. Furthermore, he has only appeared once on a video in 
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September 2014, and only two authenticated pictures of him existed before that. There are 
persistent, but unconfirmed reports of his being injured or even dead (Sky News, 2014). His 
most recent appearance was in an audio message from May this year in which he called for 
migration to the caliphate. (BBC, 2015a) Scholars state that Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ISIS’s 
official spokesman, is more influential than al-Baghdadi. According to Nagieb Khaja, who has 
interviewed among others the Jabhat al-Nusra’s leading figure Abu Sulayman Muhajir: 
“People [Jabhat al-Nusra] say that he [al-Baghdadi] is a hay man. I 
have spoken with Nusra people and they engage a lot with IS leaders. 
They say he [al-Baghdadi] does not seem like an intelligent person. 
They see him as a person who is controlled by other guys. He is a 
stooge practically; al-Adnani is much more in control than he is” 
(Naghieb Khaja). 
7.2.3 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 
It is therefore clear that al-Adnani is also very important in the ISIS hierarchy. Born in Syria, 
this official spokesman of ISIS is in charge of the media and propaganda campaigns and 
therefore plays an important role in the distribution of the ideology. (Barrett, 2014a:52) The 
high quality of the propaganda, and especially of the videos, is noteworthy. ISIS publishes 
English speaking videos and messages. Dabiq, the English language propaganda magazine of 
ISIS has existed since the proclamation of the caliphate, with of nine editions published until 
mid-June. The target group was thus widened, as ISIS now also reaches Europe with its 
propaganda. Al-Adnani’s team is particularly active in social media, disseminating 
propaganda and retweeting messages of various ISIS members. To circumvent the ever 
increasing supervision of social media, ISIS introduced an intelligent method; it created a 
Twitter app called the Dawn of Glad Tidings which enables the tweeting of centrally written 
messages on several accounts simultaneously, such that they are much more likely to be 
read and not be deleted too easily and quickly. These messages serve furthermore to 
threaten ISIS’s enemies. By describing the consequences of resistance against ISIS they 
spread fear among their enemies which supposedly worked in the conquest of Mosul, 
according to an ISIS supporter. (Kingsley, 2014) 
"The image that they convey of themselves has convinced people in 
many parts of the country, and that [was] clearly a factor in 
encouraging people to leave their posts as Isis was advancing" 
(Kingsley, 2014). 
50 
 
Apart from creating fear among the enemies, the online presence also targets potential 
European supporters. Al Hayat Media Centre is key in this kind of propaganda. Its repertoire 
consists of videos, the magazine Dabiq and reports like Islamic State Report. Dabiq replaced 
the latter magazine around the time of the proclamation of the caliphate.  Particularly well-
known are such videos as There is No Life Without Jihad42 (foreign fighters call upon Muslims 
to join ISIS) and Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun43 (a documentary style film that 
chronicles the ongoing insurgency of ISIS in Syria and Iraq), as well as various videos of 
beheadings and shootings. A video series called Mujatweet that has published eight videos 
in 2014 treats several topics; from Jihadis giving candy to children, through ISIS’s members 
who visit injured fighters in the hospital, to the normal street life, they purport to show the 
normality of life that prevails in the caliphate, as well as giving the members a voice.44 
7.3 ISIS’s ideology 
After giving an overview of the ideologues and propaganda material of ISIS, the next two 
sections aim to link the motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters to the ideology 
of ISIS. The analysis will consist of the interviews I conducted, ISIS’s propaganda material, 
and the existing interviews with foreign fighters. I will focus on Dabiq due to its current 
character and the speeches from al-Adnani and al-Baghdadi because of their standing in and 
importance to ISIS. 
In Freeden’s concept, an ideology consists of core political concepts and peripheral ones. My 
analytical approach in this section agrees with Freeden’s theory of ideologies and expands 
upon it. The involvement of only traditional political concepts such as equality or liberty does 
not allow a sufficiently thorough analysis in the case of ISIS. Untraditional concepts such as 
state building must also be included, as this goal is important to ISIS. Furthermore, 
Mannheim’s position that ideologies reflect all social and historical conditions is important. 
In the case of ISIS (and other Salafi groups) the innovations of Islam of the last decades are 
to be eradicated, therefore the social and historical component has an important meaning, 
particularly in the process of state building because of its goal to go back to a form of state 
that predominated centuries ago. ISIS is aware of the variability of Islam but wants 
                                                          
42
 See Al Hayat Media Center (2014a): There is no life without Jihad. 
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 See Al Hayat Media Center (2014): Flames of War: Fighting has Just Begun. 
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 See Zelin, A (2014a): al-Ḥayāt Media Center presents a new video message from Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Shām: “Mujatweets Episode #1″. 
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nevertheless to extinguish all innovations (although innovations like mobile phones and 
modern weapons are used without question). (Reuther, 2015:264) Moreover, the aspect of 
the ideology being a Weltanschauung after Mannheim might be the most important factor 
in the ideology of ISIS. According to their interpretation, Islam is both state and religion; 
hence it embraces every level of life. (Friedland, 2015:13) I add the view of Freeden that 
ideologies exist to convince the public that their proponents’ understanding of a certain 
political concept is the right one (chapter 4.1.5), thereby trying to end the contest over the 
meaning of concepts. Not everybody understands liberty in the same way, depending on the 
context. ISIS does exactly this, in a more extreme form, by calling its ideology the only valid 
one. Deviations are not acceptable and different understandings of the political concepts 
they touch upon absolutely out of the question. 
Following this system, I will examine the ideology of ISIS. As I mentioned in the 
operationalisation, I will investigate the goals and methods in this first step. In the second 
step (chapter 7.4), I will make the possible link between these political concepts and the 
motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters plausible. This step is necessary to 
investigate the correspondence between those two factors and argue the problem 
formulation. 
7.3.1 State building and expansion 
The core concept and the first priority in ISIS’ ideology was the establishment of the Islamic 
state in the form of a caliphate (khilafah) (Clarion Project, 2014c:7). In June 2014, they 
announced the foundation of this, and published the first edition of Dabiq, their propaganda 
magazine. The group’s name left no doubt that the state is their main and final goal. ISIS 
called itself a state, even before the announcement at Ramadan last year. That is when they 
dropped Iraq and Syria from its name. The goal is clearly stated in Dabiq: 
“The goal of establishing the Khilafah has always been one that 
occupied the hearts of the mujahidin [a person who is engaged in 
jihad] since the revival of jihad in this century” (Clarion Project, 
2014c:34). 
The caliphate is the only legitimate state form in ISIS’s view. In the declaration of the 
establishment of the caliphate it says: 
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“In light of the fact that the Islamic State has no shar’ī (legal) 
constraint or excuse that can justify delaying or neglecting the 
establishment of the khilāfah such that it would not be sinful, the 
Islamic State – represented by ahlul-halli-wal-‘aqd (its people of 
authority), consisting of its senior figures, leaders, and the shūrā 
council – resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic 
khilāfah […]” (Al Hayat Media Center, n.d.:4). 
This quote stresses that any delay to the establishment of the caliphate would be a sin; 
hence everybody who does not follow the caliph is considered a sinner. By establishing the 
caliphate one step towards the goal has been taken, but there necessarily follows the 
obligation to acquire territory for the state to control, along with the citizens of that 
territory.  Thus, the controlling and consolidation of the conquered territory by a transition 
from conquest to governance is necessary to strengthen and control the caliphate. Then 
follows the question, what does the caliphate look like? The ideology is reflected clearly in 
the system of the caliphate. 
Al-Baghdadi is the caliph Ibrahim and “the imam and khalifah for Muslims everywhere” (Al 
Hayat Media Center, n.d.:4). He has appointed a number of ministers, military commanders 
and advisors to run the caliphate. (Friedland, 2015:17) Foreign fighters enjoy the prospect of 
promotion within ISIS’s governance structure, as has been demonstrated in Raqqa. 
Generally, the highest positions are occupied by Iraqi, Saudi and Tunisian religious and 
military personalities. The positions of second priority are held by Egyptian, European, 
Chechen and Syrian fighters. (Caris and Reynolds, 2014:23) Therefore, ISIS trusts the foreign 
fighters to a certain degree. The most powerful body in ISIS is the sharia council (deciding 
penalties, ensuring party discipline, supervising the sharia police and overseeing ideological 
outreach). There is also the shura (which conveys directives from al-Baghdadi and decides on 
laws), and the security and intelligence, the military, the provincial, the finance and the 
media councils. (Barrett, 2014a:30-31) 
The caliph has both religious and political jurisdiction over the entire ummah. Hence no 
secularism exists in ISIS’s caliphate. Their interpretation of Islam penetrates every corner of 
their citizens’ everyday life as well as politics. (Friedland, 2015:13) Governance is divided into 
two broad categories; administration and Muslim services. The latter category consists of 
electricity and water supply, infrastructure, humanitarian aid and bakeries. Administration 
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includes law enforcement, sharia institutes, education, recruitment and tribal relations. The 
sharia council, as the most important body, is part of the administrative category. In July 
2014, this department had already 43 offices only in the Aleppo province including the 
stations of the religious police. (Caris and Reynolds, 2014:14) This demonstrates the 
tremendous power and capacities of ISIS. Furthermore it points out the central role of sharia 
in the caliphate. The level of sophistication of the governance programme depends on the 
level of control ISIS has in certain areas. In Raqqa, ISIS’s central city, they control the whole 
city, and the governmental programme is all-encompassing. In contrast, in other regions like 
in Deir al-Zour they have only limited governance because of the ongoing military operations 
and the lack of full control of the province (see illustration 2). (Caris and Reynolds, 2014:14) 
Nevertheless, the sophisticated level of the governance programme and their capacity to 
implement show the high level of organisation of which ISIS is capable. Implementing an all-
embracing governance programme as they do demonstrates the long term vision of the 
caliphate. Such enormous reforms and institutional establishments demonstrate that ISIS 
plans to govern Syrian territory for a long time. 
The sharia is implemented and carried out. The rules go from the haircut (if short or half long 
the hair has to be in one length) to the school system (boys and girls are taught separately, 
but girls not necessarily at all; the subjects are mathematics, Arabic, Quran exegesis and the 
history of the existing caliphate). Dress code, protection money, potential brides (they have 
to wear a white veil under the black niqab) and the merchandise of the shops are each 
controlled by the state. The campaigns to conscript young men for the military are becoming 
more aggressive. Recently, boot camps for the recruitment of children as soldiers have been 
openly promoted to ensure the ‘proper education’ of the next generation. (Reuter, 
2015:260-264) The characteristics of a completely controlling state are apparent. The Islamic 
law is imposed in all the actions of the citizens. As an example, the punishment for stealing 
something whose value is more than 40 USD is chopping off the hand of the thief 
(Todenhöfer, 2015:185). Total surveillance forces the citizens to obey the rules. Every detail 
of the citizens’ lives is managed by rules. The recently published documents of the head 
strategist Haji Bakr which were found in his house after his death in the beginning of 2014 
reveal the structure of the caliphate and describe the organisational power of their members 
(see appendix 1). The perception that the caliphate just happened to be established without 
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prior considerations is debunked with this discovery. It was carefully planned and the 
structure determined well in advance. The caliphate is divided into several wilayat 
(administrative districts) which are managed by their own administration. Appendix 1 shows 
the strong organisation even on the regional and district level as well as the emphasis on 
intelligence, security and sharia implementation activities. Appendix 3 gives an example of 
the highly organised wilayat on the basis of wilaya Aleppo. This offers an insight into the 
strategic calculation of ISIS. 
“It is like a Stasi movement. It surveys everybody and controls every 
inch of society and has informants everywhere, so people are afraid 
of ISIS. You would need a new revolution in these areas against ISIS 
but a lot of people do not have the energy. They just participated in 
one against Assad and suddenly they have a new totalitarian system 
being pulled down on them” (Nagieb Khaja). 
As Khaja points out, the population obeys out of fear and lack of energy. To them the 
revolution in 2011 did not end the totalitarian system but only exchanged the leader of it. 
Moreover, Khaja mentions the informants. These spies represent an important component 
of ISIS’s ideology and are carefully chosen and placed (see 7.2.1). Hence, the total control 
and surveillance of the population is a major feature of their ideology. It is supposed to 
ensure the control over the territory and the citizens in a long term. This enforcement of 
religious observance that permeates the private sphere of behaviour and appearance is both 
a symbol and an instrument of ISIS’s power. This ideological feature divides both behaviour 
and appearance into right and wrong, as ISIS does with the world. Al-Baghdadi explains in his 
first speech as a caliph: 
“The camp of Islam and faith and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and 
hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, 
and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them 
the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America 
and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews” (Clarion Project, 
2014c:10). 
ISIS defines clearly their enemies and their followers. Only these two categories exist, such 
that ‘you are either with us or against us’. In the second edition of Dabiq, the author Abū 
‘Amr al-Kinānī (2014) explains the need to eradicate free choice. In his point of view, free 
choice was not part of the Islam delivered by the Prophet. He refers to the story of Noah as a 
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metaphor to put across his message: if you do not worship only God you will suffer in the fire 
on the judgement day and the punishment of drowning in the flood in this dunya (worldly 
existence). Hence there is no choosing between the paths. The narrative follows the above 
mentioned division of the world. ISIS calls on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to them. There 
is only one right path to follow, either that or the flood, or, in its contemporary 
configuration, ISIS or punishment. (Al-Kinānī, 2014:5-9) This division of the world reflects 
ISIS’s Weltanschauung; there is no grey zone, there is only black or white. The concept of 
tawhid and takfir becomes apparent. 
 “In their tactic and strategy they are local, but in their goal they are 
not local. They want to expand. They have elements in Libya; they 
have Boko Haram, elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the 
Pakistani Taliban” (Nagieb Khaja). 
Khaja explains an important long term goal, expansion. After the consolidation of the 
recently proclaimed state, the gain of new territory is the next, or simultaneous, aim; 
simultaneous, because the pledge of allegiance of Jihadi groups in West Africa (for example 
Boko Haram) helps the caliphate to expand at once. A German journalist and author 
interviewed the German foreign fighter Christian Emde who is currently fighting for ISIS. He 
makes the ultimate goal of ISIS clear: “We have no frontiers, we only have front lines. That 
means the expansion will not stop.” He continues replying to the question as to whether ISIS 
wants to conquer Europe one day: “We will conquer Europe one day. We do not just want 
to, we will. We are certain about that” (Interview with a German ‘IS’-Fighter, 2014). Thus, 
the goal is unequivocally the worldwide caliphate. In Dabiq ISIS finds clear words for the 
goal: 
“The Islamic State is here to stay, even if all the Christians, Jews, 
mushrikīn, and apostates despise such. And it will continue to spread 
to all corners of the Earth…” (Clarion Project, 2014:33) 
Accordingly, ISIS does not back off from their goal despite resistance. 
Having pointed out the goals of state building and expansion of the caliphate, I will go on by 
investigating the methods with which ISIS wants to achieve these goals. The following two 
sections are describing peripheral concepts as they serve as strategies to achieve the 
mentioned aims. 
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7.3.2 Eschatology and hijrah 
This section aims to examine the peripheral concept of eschatology and hijrah (migration). 
They serve as the strategies to achieve the goals mentioned above. 
Believing in eschatology is common in Islam. According to this belief, Allah alone dictates 
when the end of the world will happen, only minor and major signs can be traced back to the 
hadith of Muhammad. These signs are supposed to indicate the end of the world. This last 
day of judgement is extremely important in the ideology of ISIS. It decides upon your destiny 
either to burn in the flames or to enter paradise. According to the Islamic eschatology the 
last battle takes place in Dabiq (a town in Syria) between the Muslims and the (then) Roman 
army. The Muslims will unite and be victorious. ISIS sees itself as fulfilling this prophecy but 
with the Romans now replaced by the US army and their allies. The quote from al-Zarqawi 
which marks the beginning of every Dabiq edition does not raise doubts about their 
intention to fulfil the prophecy. 
“The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to 
intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies 
[the west particularly the US] in Dabiq” (Clarion Project, 2014c:2). 
This final victory of Islam and the Muslims over the enemies is a prophecy ISIS wants to fulfil. 
ISIS uses eschatology as a strategic means. Calling itself ‘the fulfillers of the prophecy’ raises 
the ‘value’ and accountability of the group. They are not just any Jihadi group, but the one 
which is commissioned to the fulfilment of the holy prophecy. That is why ISIS draws a 
parallel between its own and the prophesied actions. ISIS sees itself as the group behind 
which the Muslims must unite in order to win the battle in Dabiq. Moreover, ISIS promises 
paradise for their fighters. Everybody who is not fighting for them will be punished on the 
judgement day. Eschatology works as a means of exerting pressure. 
“Then [in the final battle] one third of them will flee; Allah will never 
forgive them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs 
with Allah. And one third will conquer them; they will never be 
afflicted with fitnah [trial]” (Clarion Project, 2014c:50). 
The reward for death in a religious battle or as a martyr takes away the fear of death. Fear of 
death is natural, but anyone not afraid of dying will be stronger, especially in a fight. They 
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will fight in a way that those who do fear death will not. Therefore, eschatology is not only 
used for applying pressure to Muslims but also for making them stronger on the battlefield 
by removing the fear that would otherwise hold them back. 
The ideology of ISIS is based on the call for migration (hijrah) to the caliphate. 
“O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah 
(emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah 
to the land of Islam is obligatory” (Clarion Project, 2014c:11). 
Muslims around the world are to travel to Iraq and Syria to join the caliphate. It is seen as a 
religious obligation to support the caliph and to move to the caliphate. 
“Do not say to yourself, ‘I might get arrested.’ That fear is unsure and 
the obligation of hijrah is certain” (Clarion Project, 2014c:33). 
This obligation is therefore of the highest priority. No obstacles or fear should delay the 
migration. The presentation of the caliphate with its everyday life and the smiling people on 
the streets in the propaganda videos is intended to create an image of a lively, well-
organised and secure place. Just recently, the British hostage John Cantlie appeared in a 
video called From inside Mosul showing his audience the markets and the virtues of the life 
in the second largest city of Iraq. 
"What I can see is thousands of people, thousands of Iraqis going 
about their daily business here in Mosul after years of oppression 
under Saddam's rule and the descent into chaos that followed the 
American invasion."45 
The message is clear. The image that the West tries to draw is wrong and life has only 
improved under ISIS. ISIS intends to create a good reputation for their caliphate. It serves as 
a counterpart to the brutal videos of beheading people. ISIS wants to attract people to move 
to the caliphate and start a new life there, and not just the fighters who can support the 
Jihadis in their expansion, hijrah is a call just as much to the families or women who are 
necessary to build up a state. Population is needed; women to marry the fighters and 
children to enable a new generation of people living in and fighting for the caliphate. 
                                                          
45
 See Al Hayat Media Center (2015): From inside Mosul. 
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Moreover, ISIS supports its ideological stand point by quoting a hadith: 
“Whoever wishes to be saved from the fire and enter paradise should 
die believing in Allah and the Last Day, and should treat people the 
way he wishes to be treated. Whoever pledges allegiance to an 
imam, giving him his hand in sincerity, should obey him as much as 
he is able to. And if another man comes forward disputing his 
legitimacy, then strike that other man’s neck” (Clarion Project, 
2014c:28). 
If you do not pledge allegiance and obey the imam (al-Baghdadi) unconditionally, you 
become a sinner. Denying the caliph makes people traitors. To achieve the goal of 
consolidating the caliphate not only fighters but especially engineers, doctors and specialists 
are needed and sought out (Clarion Project, 2014c:11). ISIS claims that hijrah grants 
forgiveness of all the sins (Clarion Project, 2014c:24). The contrary, denying hijrah, will 
entrain punishment by the fire on the last day, as in the quote above. Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of the hadith must be seen critically. ISIS reads the sayings literally and 
without context. A discussion about how to interpret or even read the Quran or hadith is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the verification or justification of the way of acting 
by quoting Quran or hadith, especially from radical groups, must be considered carefully. In 
this case, the hadith is used to express the necessity of obedience to ISIS and the use of 
violence against people who question the correctness of the cause; the more moderate 
texts, such as that which requires only as much obedience as anyone is reasonably able to 
give, are ignored. Extreme interpretations like this support the claim of scholars and 
especially Muslims worldwide who call ISIS un-Islamic. According to them, Islam stands for 
something other than violence and war, and is rather a religion of peace. 
“It [ISIS] is not Islamic or a caliphate in any way. It is a gang of people 
who are just being brutal and killing people” (Fatih Alev). 
Hijrah plays an important role in two respects; first, the above explained hijrah of potential 
fighters and citizens. Second, hijrah is part of the strategy to establish the caliphate by 
migrating to a land with a weak state apparatus, attacking the enemy in order to bring the 
state to a total collapse, and then building up the caliphate in the ensuing power vacuum. 
(Clarion Project, 2014c:38) 
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Although videos which intend to picture the life in the caliphate as normal are still getting 
published, the latest speeches by al-Adnani and al-Baghdadi indicate a shift in the strategy. 
After promoting hijrah extensively in the first months of the caliphate, the call for attacking 
the enemy in their home countries grows louder. 
7.3.3 Jihad 
This part aims to investigate the peripheral concept of jihad as a strategy to achieve the 
previously mentioned goals. 
“So abandoning hijrah – the path to jihād – is a dangerous matter. In 
effect, one is thereby deserting jihād and willingly accepting his tragic 
condition of being a hypocritical spectator” (Clarion Project, 
2014c:27). 
According to ISIS, jihad is an obligation for Muslims. It is a necessary condition for life 
according to the headline in Dabiq named “There is no life without jihad and there is no jihad 
without hijrah” (Clarion Project, 2014c:31). The quote and the headline each point out that 
hijrah is the path to jihad and therefore a necessary condition for it, while jihad is 
conditioning life. Jihad should only be committed after migrating to the caliphate, which 
means that jihad should be practised in Syria and Iraq but not in the home countries. This 
strategy in ISIS’s ideology shifted quickly in the months after the announcement of the 
caliphate. Both hijrah and jihad remain an important aspect of the ideology but the latter 
should be practised in the home countries as well. Al-Adnani mentions the possibility to fight 
worldwide in his speech Indeed your Lord is ever watchful in September 2014. 
“If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the 
spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any 
other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the 
citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the 
Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way 
however it may be” (al-Adnani, 2014:9). 
The brutality and ruthlessness becomes apparent in this speech. Any ‘disbeliever’ must be 
killed in any possible manner. He goes on by saying: 
“And whoever is a disbeliever, his wealth is legal for a Muslim to take 
and his blood is legal to spill. His blood is like the blood of a dog; 
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there is no sin for him in spilling it nor is there any blood money to be 
paid for doing so” (al-Adnani, 2014:10). 
This statement dictates the value of a person’s life according to their belief. ISIS regard 
themselves as the judge of the world. They allow themselves to decide whose life is worth 
more or less while using the comparison with a dog to emphasise the lesser value of a 
disbeliever. Disbelievers in the case of ISIS are everybody whose values differ from theirs; as 
defined by the sharia, Quran and hadith. This includes other groups of Muslims as well, such 
as the Shia Muslims, Sufis and Alawites because of their different interpretations of Islam. 
Moreover, Christians and Jews are considered disbelievers. Nonetheless, a small number of 
disbelievers lives in the caliphate under strict rules and supervision. There are special laws 
for them in exchange for protection (see appendix 2). Additionally, such minorities living in 
the caliphate have to pay additional taxation as non-Muslims in order to be allowed to live 
there. (Caris and Reynolds, 2014:16) These rules are closely related to the rules regarding 
the life of non-Muslims mentioned in the sharia. Therefore, this is not a new invention by 
ISIS. Despite the killing of a vast number of Christians, ISIS’s position is nevertheless at least 
partly ambiguous towards Christians. Although ISIS has declared “jihad against the Jews, the 
Christians, the Rafidah [Shia], and the proponents of democracy” (Clarion Project, 2015:70), 
they granted rules to protect the Christians in Raqqa. The so-called protection of minorities 
is therefore rather a disenfranchisement of them and another tool to control the society. 
Simultaneously, the above quote calls upon the killing of people around the world. Hence, 
violence and killing in the light of jihad is a legitimate means to use. It is a tool to achieve 
ISIS’s ultimate goal of a worldwide caliphate. 
Violence consists not only of physical violence by the use of weapons (execution by 
beheadings or firing squad), but also includes slavery. In the latest edition of Dabiq, ISIS 
explains the legitimate institution of saby, taking women captured in wars as sex slaves. 
“Indeed when slavery befalls a people, then they have left Allah’s 
favour, so Allah has no need for them” (Clarion Project, 2015:47). 
Saby is hence a divine punishment. If people lose the right path, then they are punished with 
saby. But the concerned people should be thankful because saby offers them a second 
chance: 
61 
 
“Indeed, from the slave-girls are those that after saby turned hard-
working, diligent seekers of knowledge after she found in Islam what 
she couldn’t find in kufr, despite the slogans of “freedom” and 
“equality”. Indeed it is our pure Islam, which upraises every lowly-
one and puts an end to every deficiency” (Clarion Project, 2015:48). 
This quote not only indicates that being a sex slave of a Muslim man is a blessing for the 
woman, because, as a consequence she has the chance to find Islam; but also, by mentioning 
the concepts of freedom and equality in this context, ISIS degrades the system prevalent in 
the West, consistent with Freeden’s position that ideologies compete to provide the agenda 
for public policy. Thereby, the legitimacy of their ideology should be raised or should, in fact, 
be the only legitimate ideology. The institution of sex slavery is not therefore to be 
condemned, because it offers a good opportunity for kafir to find the right path. Once a 
slave embraces Islam, she and her children are freed and even able to enter paradise. The 
cruelty of the institution is justified by the use that Muhammad and his Prophets constantly 
made of it. Again this institution supports the division of the world into two parts, or two 
kinds of people; believers and unbelievers and violence in the name of jihad is thus justified 
by this categorisation. Believers are allowed to use violence and decide the fate of a human 
life in order to assure the victory of Islam over all other religions, and hence achieve the 
worldwide caliphate. 
Consequently, it becomes very apparent that ISIS’s ideology is not peaceful. According to 
them the need to use violence lies in the very nature of Islam. In their own words: “Islam is 
the religion of the sword” (Clarion Project, 2015:20). It is a reference to a hadith saying that 
the Prophet was sent to earth with four swords which shall be used to fight the ones who do 
not believe in Allah or the judgement day as well as to fight the apostates (Clarion Project, 
2015:21). Again ISIS justifies its violent actions by a literal interpretation of the hadith. 
Because only their own interpretation of Islam is acceptable, ISIS is in a state of war with 
numerous religious groups as well as 60 nations (Todenhöfer, 2015:190). They fight for 
supremacy in the region and force other Jihadi groups to pledge allegiance to them. ISIS thus 
submits to nobody, but instead calls for other groups to follow their cause. In the speech 
This is the promise of Allah by al-Adnani, in which the caliphate was announced, he orders: 
“We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of khilafah, it is 
incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalifah 
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Ibrahim and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all 
emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the 
expansion of the khilafah’s authority and arrival of its troops to their 
areas” (Al Hayat Media Center, n.d.:5). 
Hence, no cooperation with other factions is possible unless they pledge allegiance to the 
caliph. In addition, it is apparent that borders of the modern national states are not accepted 
and are erased with the expansion of the caliphate. The control over the society living in the 
caliphate is reflected here in the supremacy. ISIS does not allow anyone on a higher or the 
same level of power as they are, because ISIS sees itself as the fulfiller of the prophecy. 
Therefore, according to ISIS, all Muslims must and will follow the caliph. 
“It is a group that wants to dominate. IS tries to dominate all the 
other rebel groups. But they do not subordinate to IS, they started 
fighting IS” (Nagieb Khaja). 
Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda have each openly fought ISIS since the beginning of 2014 
(Zelin, 2014:5). 
7.4 Does the ideology reflect the motivations of Europeans to become foreign fighters? 
After having analysed the ideology of ISIS, I will undertake the last step of my analysis and 
elaborate on the relation between the ideology and the motivations of Europeans to 
become foreign fighters. This section aims to link chapter 6 (European foreign fighters) with 
chapter 7. For that, I will use the same grouping as previously in chapter 6.2; identity and 
affiliation, boredom, and help and support. Additionally, the categorisation of chapter 7.3 
(state building and expansion, eschatology and hijrah and jihad) will be maintained. Table 1 
helps to clarify the link between the two factors. This figure is purely a schematic to compare 
my results and assess the correspondence between motivations and ideology in only the 
broadest terms, and necessarily suffers the overlaps and deficiencies found in any schematic 
representation. I can give the example of jihad which is a concept of ISIS’s ideology but 
simultaneously represents a motivational factor in two categories. Hence, ideological 
concepts and motivations cross categorisations and are not static factors of one category. In 
the next section I shall account for this in more detail. 
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Table 1: Reflection of the motivations in the ideology 
 Ideology 
  State building 
and expansion 
Eschatology and 
hijrah 
Jihad 
 
Motivations 
Identity and 
affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
Boredom    
Help and 
support 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: own chart) 
7.4.1 Identity and affiliation 
My previous analysis has shown that the feeling of being excluded and discriminated against 
in the foreign fighters’ home countries in Europe is a strong motivation. Hence, they are 
seeking a community or brotherhood to which they can belong that accepts and welcomes 
them. Moreover, foreign fighters are going to Syria seek a status in order to achieve 
something in life. They leave their lives behind in their search for recognition. The feeling of 
not being appreciated in their home countries plays a major role in their motivations. 
ISIS aims to collect the ummah in one place by calling upon the Muslims to migrate to the 
caliphate. At the latest, when the last battle starts, the ummah will reunite behind the 
caliph, according to ISIS’s belief. The call for hijrah makes the foreign fighters feel welcome 
and needed. In addition to the need for fighters, but specialists will inevitably be required to 
consolidate the governance and administer the state. Therefore fighters who go to Syria will 
find people like themselves who have experienced problems or discrimination at home. ISIS 
targets those seekers for a new home by publishing propaganda material in which they 
present the caliphate as a desirable place to live. Normal everyday life is placed in the 
forefront of these videos, as analysed in the case of From inside Mosul in chapter 7.3.2. 
Additionally, the final goal of ISIS is the worldwide caliphate, thereby eradicating borders 
and cultural as well as ethnic boundaries. This corresponds with the issue of foreign fighters 
not belonging to a community. The ‘feeling of being different’ experienced by Muslims in 
Europe is erased because European culture is no longer relevant. Everybody would be linked 
to each other by the same faith and the sharia. 
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In addition, the fixed value system of ISIS offers understandable ‘answers’ to the complex 
questions in life. The ideology of ISIS, and that of other similar radical groups, offers an easy 
Weltanschauung that supports the motto ‘either with us or against us’. Khaterah Parwani 
argues that, “it [travelling to Syria] offers a break from the essential but complex questions 
of life.” ISIS dictates who the enemy is, and who the friend. Therefore, the young Muslims 
who mention an identity problem as their motivation no longer have to decide upon many of 
these questions for themselves. Hence, the control of every corner of their lives can be seen 
as a tool to guide (and seduce) these people. ISIS decides on their behalf. 
Moreover, ISIS’s ideology corresponds with the foreign fighters’ recognition-seeking. The 
examples of foreign fighters46 have shown that high rank positions are not only reserved for 
Iraqi or Syrian affiliates. Hence, apart from the call for hijrah, the positioning of foreign 
fighters reflects the welcoming atmosphere and appreciation shown towards them. As a 
result, according to my research, the motivations of the identity- and recognition-seekers 
correspond with the ideology in two categories. That is why table 1 ticks off both state 
building and expansion and eschatology and hijrah. 
7.4.2 Boredom 
The motive boredom is tricky to understand. It is almost certain that fighters who join ISIS do 
not experience boredom anymore. The thrill seekers can find their adventure in Syria and 
leave the routine of their lives at home. Real life combat experiences offer those Europeans 
an exciting escape from everyday life. Nonetheless, it depends on what kind of thrill the 
fighters are looking for. As mentioned above, parts of ISIS’s interpretation of jihad are very 
brutal. To pick out some aspects: beheadings, burning alive and sex slavery. It is open to 
question whether those methods respond to the need of adventure or if the brutality 
exceeds their imagination. Returnees47 mention the brutality as a factor in their decision to 
leave ISIS, but this terror organisation nevertheless still has thousands of foreign fighters 
who stay with them and call upon other Muslims to follow their example.48 Criminals and 
gang members number amongst these. According to my analysis, criminals experience of 
violence in their lives inclines them to be motivated by ISIS’s interpretation of jihad; as 
                                                          
46
 See Denis Cuspert, a German rapper who supposedly works in the Al Hayat Media Center (Rose, 2014). 
47
 See Monitor (2015): Deutsche Dschihadisten der erste Rückkehrer erzählt seine Geschichte. 
48
 See Al Hayat Media Center (2014a): There is no life without Jihad. 
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Khaterah Parwani puts it: “They [the criminals] just change the group they are attached to.” 
Consequently, they maintain their violent habits but only change the environment in which 
they indulge them. 
Table 1 ticks off jihad because ISIS offers the foreign fighters an environment in which thrill 
seekers can get rid of their boredom and criminals can continue to be violent. 
7.4.3 Help and support 
According to my analysis the motivation to help their fellow Sunni Muslims is an obligation 
felt by many foreign fighters. Two factors play a role here. First, the distribution of pictures 
and information about the Assad regime killing Sunni Muslims gained much worldwide 
attention. Second, the lack of help from the western as well as the Arabic countries made 
European Muslims felt that they had to act themselves. The announcement of the caliphate 
and the introduction of the sharia reflect this motivation as ISIS creates a safe haven for 
Sunni Muslims. Since the establishment of this haven the stream of foreign fighters has not 
stopped, and the propaganda by the fighters themselves (videos as well as social media 
posts) has only increased. This clearly indicates the commitment to the caliphate. Jihad is the 
means for helping Sunni Muslims. A German foreign fighter clarifies: 
“I am here to free the people from the oppressive Assad regime. That 
is jihad. And who is getting killed meanwhile is a martyr” 
(Todenhöfer, 2015:53, my translation). 
Therefore, the motivation of toppling the Assad regime corresponds with the ideology of 
ISIS. ISIS fights the government, but has yet to actually replace the regime. Assad is still 
officially in charge, even if his influence is waning. The quote above exemplifies the different 
interpretations of jihad. According to my analysis, almost all foreign fighters are prepared to 
fight in the name of God to defend their fellow brothers and sisters but the means and ways 
differ. Consequently, I argue that foreign fighters who go to Syria out of humanitarian 
reasons do not agree with the interpretation of jihad ISIS represents. ISIS does not only fight 
Assad’s regime, but also and simultaneously the West and other Jihadi groups in Syria and 
Iraq. This sectarian part of the ideology does not reflect the group of foreign fighters who 
left Europe to fight the regime to protect their fellow Muslims. Therefore, the jihad which 
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the foreign fighters are prepared to fight does not correspond with the jihad which ISIS 
fights. 
Finally, the announcement of the caliphate and its call upon hijrah allows the Sunni Muslims 
to have territory under their own rule. This achievement and furthermore the fulfilment of 
the prophecy are strong magnets for foreign fighters. Being part of a process to build up a 
caliphate is a historical event in the eyes of the foreign fighters. Thus, eschatology and hijrah 
correspond with the motivation of the foreign fighters to help and support their fellow 
Muslims. Moreover table 1 shows ticks in the row corresponding to ‘Help and support’ for 
the boxes ‘state building and expansion’ and ‘eschatology and hijrah’ but not in the last 
‘jihad’ box. 
“[The motivation] is a mixture of different things but of course the 
ideology is an important thing, but at the same time I would say that 
some of the guys are not so ideologically motivated as they become 
later on when they stayed down there and studied and took courses. 
But you also have some people who are there for ideological reasons 
who really believe in the cause and think this really is something that 
is important. They think they have to do this, to give this ultimate 
sacrifice because it is part of their ideology; have a state, have a 
caliph you pledge allegiance to otherwise you are a sinner” (Nagieb 
Khaja). 
Fighters who arrive in Syria are obliged to attend a course before they are allowed to 
participate in the battle. They are isolated from the other members, their passports are 
taken away and they attend meetings in which they are brainwashed. A German returnee 
calls it “to be persuaded to ISIS” (my translation)49. This is shown in the above quote of 
Nagieb Khaja who points out the process of being ideologically indoctrinated while being in 
Syria. In those meetings they can choose between being a martyr or fighter. Brainwashed 
and without the passport it is difficult to leave ISIS again, even if some fighters would like to 
do so. Consequently, although on arrival some fighters do indeed feel shock at such things as 
the brutality, or experience doubts about the right cause of ISIS, their abandonment of ISIS is 
far from guaranteed. The motivations for Europeans to leave in the first place can therefore 
change, and most likely the motivations given by returnees or current foreign fighters who 
are still fighting for ISIS will differ. 
                                                          
49
 See Monitor (2015): Deutsche Dschihadisten der erste Rückkehrer erzählt seine Geschichte. 
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8.0 Discussion 
This section will firstly discuss the findings of the analysis, and secondly the aspects which 
need further research and treatment but could not be discussed sufficiently in a thesis on 
this scale. 
8.1 Discussion of the analysis 
My analysis shows that the ideology of ISIS reflects the motivations of the Europeans to 
become foreign fighters in many aspects. Due to Freeden’s approach the assumption in the 
public dialogue that all Jihadi groups represent the same ideology can be countered. In 
addition, the definition in chapter 3.5 shows discrepancy regarding ISIS’s branch of Jihadism. 
ISIS acts locally by building a caliphate in the territory of Syria and Iraq but their goal of 
worldwide expansion is global. The call upon their affiliates to attack ‘disbelievers’ wherever 
possible and the attacks carried out by their associated groups in other parts of the world 
indicate the international orientation and a change of strategy of ISIS even though attacks in 
the West have remained somewhat rare. 
According to my analysis, ISIS’s ideology consists of several concepts. Whereas the identity- 
and recognition-seekers see their motivations reflected in the categories of ‘state building 
and expansion’ and ‘hijrah and eschatology’, they are not in the last category of ‘jihad’. Jihad 
is the most challenging concept to analyse. I acknowledge that recognition-seekers can gain 
status and prove themselves on the battlefield by following ISIS’s interpretation of jihad. 
However, as argued in my analysis, the particularly violent interpretation of jihad does not 
serve as a major motivational aspect for Europeans. Rather the fulfilment of the prophecy 
and the fight against Assad motivate the fighters to pick up a weapon. Therefore, jihad is not 
ticked off in table 1. 
Whereas the caliphate corresponds with the motivational categories of ‘identity and 
affiliation’ as well as ‘help and support’, the attraction of the structure of this is difficult to 
analyse. The surveillance can serve as a tool for guidance in the case of identity-seekers, 
however, it can have the opposite effect in the case of the two remaining groups. It can lead 
to a feeling of lacking freedom as well as to fear. The purpose of that concept is thus 
fulfilled, but whether it reflects the motivations of the Europeans is open to question. 
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8.2 Omitted variables 
Having analysed the phenomenon of the foreign fighters in the case of Syria, I acknowledge 
the fact that for the creation of a universal explanation for their travel more research is 
needed. This thesis offers a profound snapshot but lacks literature to serve as an all-
encompassing clarification of the foreign fighters’ phenomenon. This lack manifests itself in 
several areas I touched upon. Reliable information about the number of foreign fighters 
from each country is not available, which hinders any dependable estimation about the 
dimension of the phenomenon. Additionally, the purpose of the travel is important to 
investigate, as the division of foreign fighters into humanitarian workers and fighters could 
give a more detailed picture of the motivations and thereby could allow a more 
comprehensive link with the ideology of ISIS by differentiating between the two groups of 
motivations. Moreover, social-economic investigation of the foreign fighters would give 
more insight into their environment and therefore add further possible influential factors to 
the discourse. Finally, the recruitment system must be elaborated regarding potential 
intermediaries in Europe or online self-radicalisation. This can offer new input for the 
political debate about how to counteract the phenomenon of foreign fighters. 
 
9.0 Conclusion 
The mentioned lack of academic literature in each of the cases of foreign fighters in Syria 
and the ideology of ISIS demands methodological triangulation. This method compensates 
for the gaps in the respective types of data and is therefore particularly evident in this thesis. 
As to this method, the investigation of the motivations of Europeans to become foreign 
fighters is made possible. 
My thesis serves to investigate the possible link between the motivations of Europeans to 
become foreign fighters and the ideology of ISIS. The analysis shows that there is a 
connection between these two aspects. Freeden’s morphological approach to the analysis of 
ideologies is essential in that it demands a breakdown of the respective matter, and makes 
the in-depth analysis of ISIS’s ideology possible. Although almost all Islamist organisations 
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are ideologically attached to Jihadism, Freeden argues that the various concepts must be 
investigated. In this case the ideology of ISIS was decomposed into three concepts. 
First, state building and expansion is the core concept and goal of ISIS’s ideology. It aims to 
secure the rule in a long-term. This goal causes the Europeans to migrate in order to support 
the safe haven thus created for Sunni Muslims. It is linked to the motivation to help Sunni 
Muslims, as well as that to find a community into which they are accepted. The 
Weltanschauung of ISIS and the total surveillance by the state take away the responsibility of 
the foreign fighters to make many of their own decisions. The division of the world in two 
camps responds to the identity-seekers by offering them answers to the big questions in life. 
The reception of this Weltanschauung by a foreign fighter causes the acceptance of ISIS’s 
interpretation of jihad in order to defend their own camp, although it was not a motivational 
factor in the first place. 
Second, the peripheral concept of hijrah serves as a strategy of ISIS to consolidate the 
governance. Moreover, it makes the foreign fighters feel welcome and wanted in the 
caliphate. This has resulted in the current stream of foreign fighters joining ISIS because it 
satisfies the search of the Europeans for recognition and a brotherhood. Therefore, hijrah is 
on the one hand a strategic tool for ISIS, but on the other hand a reflection of the 
motivations. Furthermore, eschatology of ISIS as fulfillers of the prophecy causes two 
processes; it secures the dominance within the region as the other radical groups pledge 
allegiance to them, and it also attracts foreign fighters; each of these increasing the power 
and the legitimacy of ISIS. 
Third, the peripheral concept of jihad results in different reactions. ISIS’s interpretation of 
jihad according to my analysis is very violent. This results in the refraining of some foreign 
fighters from going to the caliphate in order to protect their fellow Sunni Muslims. 
Accordingly, it mainly does not reflect the motivations of the foreign fighters but rather 
serves as a strategy to create fear in their opponents. The group of foreign fighters who are 
attracted by this interpretation of jihad are mostly the criminals who have previously 
experienced and committed violent actions. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Draft for a Secret Service Structure for Islamic State 
 
(Source: Reuter, 2015a) 
 
 
Appendix 2: Seven rules in return for Christians’ safety 
1. No public worship 
2. No treachery against ISIS 
3. No church construction or repairs 
4. Do not display crosses in Muslim areas or markets 
5. Praying must be done quietly and should never be heard by Muslims 
6. No mockery of Muslims or Islam 
7. Do not prevent others from converting to Islam 
(Source: Spencer, 2014) 
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Appendix 3: How ISIS rules the Wilayat Aleppo 
This document is an extract from a report released on 25 June, 2014 through the Islamic 
State’s Twitter account ‘Wilayat Aleppo’. This account does not exist anymore, but 
nevertheless this document gives an interesting insight into the ISIS’s governance structure 
of the caliphate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Courts: One Main court and the 
remainder Sub-courts. They govern by the 
laws of God, implement the hudud 
punishments, ensure rights, and extend 
justice; dozens of cases are dealt with 
daily, and it is based upon a legal and 
administrative cadre. 
10 Religious Police Headquarters: They 
promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up 
sources of evil, and prevent the 
manifestation of disobedience, and urge 
Muslims towards well-being. 
11 Da’wa [preaching of Islam] Offices: 
They carry out da’wa in the state through 
the publication of brochures, 
establishment of da’wa tents and so on. 
10 Police Stations: They maintain internal 
security and administer the patrols to 
protect people, family, and money. 
5 Services Offices: They administer 
services of the people in various fields 
from electricity to water to bakeries to 
municipal services to traffic to 
humanitarian aid offices. 
22 Shari’a institutes: Muslims learn in the 
institutes the most important issues of 
their religion from Aqida [creed] and Fiqh 
[jurisprudence] and Quran. 
Width – 110km 
Length – 120km 
Bordering it from the North: Turkey 
And from the West (from North to 
South): The Sahawat al-Sham in the 
northern countryside and the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad in the southern 
countryside 
And from the south: Wilayat Homs 
And from the east: Wilayat Raqqa and 
Ayn al-Arab (in which the PKK is 
concentrated) 
Wilayat Aleppo: It returned to the dominion of the Muslims and was 
governed with Sharia under the rule of the Commander of the Faithful (Amir 
al-Mu’minin) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since April 2014 
5 Main Cities 
450 Villages 
Population: 
1,200,000 
Area: 10,000 Sq Km 
Greater than the 
area of 48 other 
countries in the 
world 
Front Lines 
130 km 
60% of this is on the 
front lines against 
the regime 
The State contains water 
supplies from the 
Euphrates Dam that fill a 
need for water and 
irrigation. 
The Power Generating 
Stations work to provide 
electricity in the State 
(Source: Caris and Reynolds, 2014:27) 
